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Abstract 
Treatment of musical borrowing under current copyright standards is far too often 
inequitable.  This is evident in the works of George Gershwin, who for a number of 
reasons was able to borrow freely from existing traditions, works and artists, 
copyright the works he produced that reflected such borrowings and then restrict 
future borrowings and reinterpretations of his works.  Looking at the operation and 
uses of copyright in the specific instance of George Gershwin’s musical practice 
reflects uses of copyright in the musical arena and demonstrates some ways in 
which current copyright rules may not adequately contemplate actual practices of 
music copyright holders.  George Gershwin borrowed from a wide range of musical 
sources, worked extensively with technical collaborators throughout his career and 
immersed himself in African American musical traditions.  Following Gershwin’s 
death, however, the Gershwin family came to control his copyrights, highlighting 
the role that heirs now play in the actual use of copyright given the fact that 
copyright duration now extends to 70 years beyond the lives of individual creators.  
The Gershwin heirs have in most cases not permitted borrowing or significant 
reinterpretation of George Gershwin’s works.  The ability of heirs to control 
borrowing from and interpretations of existing musical works reflects the fact that 
copyright structures to this point have been based on combining of rights of control 
and compensation within copyright frameworks.  Through various mechanisms, 
heirs in particular tend to exert control over uses of copyright in ways that have 
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little to do with the creation of musical works that is a major rationale for 
copyright. By potentially significantly limiting borrowing and reinterpretation, the 
exercise of control over copyright in such instances may actually hinder the 
creation of later works. Uses of copyright by creators such as Gershwin and his 
heirs suggest that it would be prudent in some instances to separate the control and 
compensation aspects of copyright, particularly in cases of post-mortem artistic 
legacies. This separation would also involve moving in the direction of a liability 
rule based standard in copyright that permits borrowing other than in instances of 
unfair use, in contrast to current standards that significantly limit borrowing except 
in limited instances such as fair use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Treatment of musical borrowings under current copyright standards is far 
too often inequitable.  This is evident in the works of George Gershwin, 
who for a number of reasons was able to borrow freely from existing 
traditions, works and artists, copyright the works he produced that 
reflected such borrowings and then restrict future borrowings and 
reinterpretations of his works.  The Gershwin case thus illustrates that 
current copyright law consideration and treatment of musical borrowing 
are generally inadequate.1 If copyright is actually intended to give all 
potential creators the incentive or ability to create, the use of existing 
works in future creations needs to be explicitly addressed and considered 
by copyright frameworks, both with respect to the sources of new works 
as well as subsequent uses of such works to create future works.  In the 
case of George Gershwin, who borrowed extensively from African 
American traditions and artists, the ability to borrow from African 
American sources was intimately connected to societal hierarchies.  These 
hierarchies were reflected in and reinforced by copyright frameworks that 
historically have permitted borrowings from certain categories and types 
of cultural expression, at times without compensation.2
1 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical 
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006) 
(hereinafter, “Arewa, Hip Hop”) (discussing the pervasiveness and importance 
of musical borrowing). 
2 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, “Piracy,” Borrowing and Global Intellectual 
Property Frameworks: History, Hierarchy and Conceptions of Culture (2005) 
(manuscript on file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Piracy”); Olufunmilayo 
B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local 
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This Article examines the uses of copyright in a particular instance, 
focusing specifically on uses connected with copyrights now controlled by 
the Gershwin family, who were a major proponent of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the “CTEA”).3 More specifically, 
this Article concentrates on the creation and uses of copyright with respect 
to George Gershwin’s body of works,4 particularly the opera Porgy and 
 
Knowledge and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQUETTE 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); SHIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 117-148 (2001) (discussing copyright and 
African American music); Perry A. Hall, African-American Music: Dynamics of 
Appropriation and Innovation, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL 
APPROPRIATION 31-51 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997) (discussing 
appropriation of African American musical forms); K.J. Greene, Copyright, 
Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 339 (1999) (commenting on use of copyright to appropriate African 
American music). 
3 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 
§ 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 
(2003) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976)); see also Brief Amici Curiae 
of The American Association of Publishers, Amberson Holdings LLC, Richard 
Avedon, The George Balanchine Trust, Peter Bartok, Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 
The Aaron Copland Fund for Music, Inc. European-American Music 
Corporation, The George Gershwin Family Trust, The Leonore S. Gershwin 
Trust for the Benefit of the Ira and Leonore Gershwin Philanthropic Fund, The 
Leonore S. Gershwin Trust for the Benefit of the Library of Congress, The Keith 
Haring Foundation, The Frederick Lowe Foundation, Inc., David Mamet, Glen 
Roven, The Kurt Weill Foundation for Music, In Support of the Respondents, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft (hereinafter, “Trust Brief”). 
4 Ira Gershwin, George Gershwin’s older brother, wrote lyrics for many of the 
works composed by George Gershwin and is thus a co-author for many of 
George Gershwin’s works.  Throughout this paper, the identities of George 
Copyright on Catfish Row 6 
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Bess, which premiered in 1935 shortly before Gershwin’s premature death 
at age 38 in 1937.  Gershwin is an excellent case to consider with respect 
to uses of copyright because of his success, prominence and the uses of 
copyright by him and his heirs.  Gershwin interests have also played a role 
in shaping copyright law and were closely involved in the legislative 
process that led to extensions of copyright duration in both discussions 
leading to the general revision of the Copyright Act in 1976 and the later 
passage of the CTEA.5 As such, their uses of copyright reflect the 
behaviors employed today by individual copyright holders and other 
business and commercial interests that hold significant copyrights. 
George Gershwin’s commercial success at least partially reflected his able 
uses of copyright and willingness to embrace new technologies such as 
radio and new methods of business practice in the face of changing 
technological and industry standards.6 Examination of the creation and 
uses of copyright in this specific context helps shed light on how 
copyrighted works may be created and the sources from which holders of 
such rights actually derive value.  These uses of copyright in turn can be 
drawn on to further assess the scope of rights that accompany copyright, 
not just in relation to duration, but also in terms of the effective rights of 
exclusion (sometimes termed monopoly rights) granted to copyright 
 
Gershwin’s identified co-authors are only noted when relevant to discussion.  
Further, figures for revenues to Gershwin family members of Gershwin family 
controlled entities typically reflect revenues on account of the authorship of both 
George and Ira Gershwin, unless otherwise stated. 
5 The George Gershwin Family Trust, The Leonore Gershwin Philanthropic Fund and the 
Leonore Gershwin Trust for the Benefit of the Library of Congress all participated in the 
Trust Brief, supra note 3. 
6 See infra notes 82 to 85 and accompanying text. 
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holders.  
Changes in copyright duration have serious implications for the treatment 
of copyright by heirs and legal successors following the death of a creator.  
This means that in addition to looking at uses of copyright during the life 
of creators of copyright protected works, consideration must be given to 
how such works are protected following the deaths of creators.  Since 
copyright duration now extends to essentially one lifetime beyond the 
lifetime of the individual creator of a copyrighted work, post-mortem 
industries connected to creators may develop, thrive and have new life 
even in the death of the figure upon which such industries are based.  Such 
post-mortem legacies are often evident in the case of heirs, for whom the 
maintenance and protection of the artistic legacies of dead creators is a 
core business interest.7 As is the case with living creators, such artistic 
legacies may make use of various legal rights, including rights that 
emanate from copyright, right of publicity and provisions of the Lanham 
Act, for example.8 This Article focuses on the implications of uses of 
copyright by both living composers as well as the managers of post-
mortem artistic legacies that may also have rights emanating from 
 
7 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Elvis Industry and the Cultures of Elvis: : 
Borrowing, Icons and Intellectual Property (2006) (manuscript on file with 
author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Elvis”). 
8 See, e.g., Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal., 1980) (discussing invasion of Ira Gershwin’s right of publicity on account of dramatic 
live stage production of ‘Let's Call the Whole Thing Gershwin”); Gilliam v.  American 
Broadcasting Co. (ABC), 583 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding violation of Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act by ABC on account of ABC’s modifications of Monty Python comic 
sketches). 
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copyright.9
Because of his early death, George Gershwin represents an early example 
of a post-mortem artistic legacy at a time when copyright duration was 
shorter.  The uses of copyright by Gershwin and his heirs can thus shed 
light on the operation of post-mortem artistic legacies in today’s copyright 
environment.  Consideration of Gershwin’s composition practices and the 
treatment of his musical legacy by his heirs also lends support to the 
benefits of separating the control and compensation elements of post-
mortem artistic legacies.10 
Part I of this Article focuses on assumptions often made with respect to 
the creation of copyrighted works and particularly the extent to which 
rights of control and compensation are treated as linked and inherent parts 
of the rights of copyright holders.  Part II looks at the creation of Porgy 
and Bess, discussing George Gershwin’s musical borrowings in Porgy and 
Bess and other works.  Part III concentrates on the uses of copyright by the 
Gershwin trusts that control Porgy and Bess and other copyrights of 
George Gershwin and his brother Ira, who often acted as George 
Gershwin’s lyricist.  Part IV examines the implications of the social and 
cultural contexts of copyright for the creation of works such as Porgy and 
Bess and the significance of control exercised and evident in various uses 
 
9 This Article focuses on the uses of copyright and does not consider other rights such as 
moral rights that involve recognition of “interests of authors and artists in their work that 
are separate from copyright” and that may be retained even after transfer of an author or 
artist’s copyright to third parties.  See Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, Authors’ and 
Artists’ Moral Rights:  A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 95, 
95 (1997). 
10 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text. 
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of copyright.  Part V discusses alternative transmission based liability rule 
approaches to music copyright that may be a basis upon which to 
determine copyright infringement by which the control and compensation 
aspects of copyright frameworks might be disaggregated. 
I. COPYRIGHT, CREATION AND CONTROL 
A. The Scope and Duration of Copyright 
Treatment of borrowings within copyright law is increasingly of concern 
given the progressive expansion of copyright duration and breadth during 
the twentieth century.11 This increase in duration is evident in copyright 
treatment of the piano concerto Rhapsody in Blue, one of George 
Gershwin’s most famous and lucrative works.  At its creation in 1924, 
Rhapsody in Blue was entitled to a maximum of 56 years of copyright 
protection under the 1909 Copyright Act,12 which would have meant that 
its copyright would have originally expired in 1980.  As a result of 
lobbying by copyright industries and copyright heirs, the 1976 general 
revision to United States Copyright Law (as amended, the “Copyright 
Act”) extended the duration of copyright protection of existing works, 
 
11 See Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the 
Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 
518 (1999) (“Congress has repeatedly extended the breadth and scope of 
copyright protection, straining the meaning of the phrase ‘for limited times’ well 
beyond any historical recognition”). 
12 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, Rhapsody in Blue would have been entitled to 
an initial 28 year term and one 28 year renewal term.  See Section 24, Copyright 
Act of 1909, ch. 320, superceded by the Copyright Act of 1976, 35 Stat. 1075, 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1010 (2003)). 
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giving Rhapsody in Blue an additional nineteen years of copyright 
protection until 1999.13 A number of profitable works, including those of 
George Gershwin and a number of prominent Disney characters, were 
then scheduled to lose copyright protection in and around the late 1990s.14 
Not surprisingly, commercial interests that derive revenue from ownership 
of copyrights and that include copyright heirs and content providers, again 
sought to expand the duration of their copyrights and licensing revenue 
streams.  Such behaviors reflect strategic uses of intellectual property 
through legislative enforcementthat have become increasingly common in 
recent years.15 Their efforts had their desired effect and helped ensure 
passage of the CTEA. 
As a result of the CTEA, Rhapsody in Blue is now protected by copyright 
 
13 See Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the 
Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 20-
23 (2002) (noting lobbying by copyright industries with respect to the Copyright 
Act of 1976, which gave existing works that previously were entitled to a 
maximum of 56 years of protection a new term of life plus 50 years); E. Scott 
Johnson, Law Gives Copyright New Life, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 8, 1999, at C12 
(noting that copyright protection would have expired for Rhapsody in Blue on 
December 31, 1999 without the Copyright Term Extension Act). 
14 See infra notes 20 to 21 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text; see also Olufunmilayo B. 
Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition: Intangibles, Intellectual Property 
and Innovation (2005) (manuscript on file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, 
Strategic Behaviors”); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, 	
			
								 	

	
 
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until December 31, 2019,16 giving a total of 85 years of copyright 
protection to this work.  Although the increase in duration does give 
Gershwin’s heirs an additional 20-year stream of licensing revenues, it 
also extends the period of time during which his heirs can exercise broad 
control over uses of this and other Gershwin works.  This exercise of 
control by Gershwin heirs and other copyright holders can impede the 
creation of future works and significantly limit reinterpretations of 
existing works.17 Moreover, the expansion of copyright duration has little 
to do with incentives to create new works, particularly in Gershwin’s case, 
since he can no longer create new works.  It is highly questionable 
whether such expansion significantly expands incentives to create works 
for existing creators either.  Even if such expansion does increase 
incentives for existing creators, the costs of this expansion are potentially 
quite high both with respect to the public domain, those who seek to 
interpret existing works as well as creators of new works who base their 
creations on existing works. 
The potential costs of extending copyright duration suggests that on 
balance the current scope of copyright needs to be tempered at a minimum 
by reducing in certain instances the control rights that accompany 
copyright protection and significantly limiting the expansion in duration to 
rights that relate to compensation for uses of protected works.18 This 
would entail significantly reducing or eliminating the control rights 
granted to heirs and others who control post-mortem artistic legacies under 
 
16 See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 23 (noting that the copyright on Rhapsody in 
Blue will not expire until December 31, 2019). 
17 See infra notes 206 to 252and accompanying text 
18 See infra notes 310 to 330 and accompanying text. 
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copyright laws.  The scope of copyright interests of such post-mortem 
legacies would thus be limited in most cases to an economic rights with a 
reduction of rights of control of future uses of copyrighted material. 
B. Copyright Discourse and the CTEA: General and Specific 
Instances of Copyright Use 
The CTEA represents a significant event in the history of American 
copyright law.19 The CTEA lengthened the term of copyright protection 
in the United States by 20 years, extending copyright protection to 70 
years beyond the life of individual creators of copyrighted works,20 
leading it to be called the “Mickey Mouse” Law on account of its rescuing 
Mickey Mouse from becoming part of the public domain.21 The 
 
19 See Christina N. Gifford, Note: The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 378 (2000) (“The CTEA is one of the most drastic 
changes in copyright law since the current Copyright Act took effect in 1978.”); 
Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The 
Copyright Term Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the 
Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 193 (2004), 
available at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n2/Langvardt.pdf. 
20 See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I 
Stayed Too Long?”, 52 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000) (discussing the one-sided 
nature of much of the Congressional testimony associated with passage of the 
CTEA and the fact that the CTEA extension is both prospective and 
retrospective in application). 
21 See Dennis Harney, Note: Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 291, 291 (2002) (noting that 
Mickey Mouse will now enter the public domain in 2024 instead of 2004 as a 
result of the CTEA); Gifford, supra note 19, at 385 (noting that Michael Eisner 
went to lobby personally for passage of the CTEA); FREE EXPRESSION POLICY 
PROJECT, “THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”: WHY COPYRIGHT 
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importance of the CTEA is reflected in the resources that were directed 
toward both assuring and preventing its passage and the atypical alliances 
that arose to challenge its passage.22 The dispute concerning the CTEA 
continued in court after its passage, culminating most recently in the case 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the CTEA.23 
Not surprisingly, CTEA proponents were weighed heavily toward the 
copyright industries and content providers; the briefs presented to the 
Supreme Court in favor of upholding the CTEA in Eldred included briefs 
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association, AOL Time 
 
TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 2 (2003) (discussing the 
aggressive campaign by Disney and other companies promoting term extension) 
(hereinafter, “FEP, Intellectual Freedom”); Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free 
Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright Act of 
1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254 (2003) (arguing that Disney Mickey 
Mouse copyrights are void on account of Disney’s failure to meet copyright 
notice requirements applicable at the time of publication); Phyllis Schafly, Why 
Disney Has Clout with the Republican Congress, Nov. 28, 1998 (noting that the 
following Disney copyrights were soon to expire without the CTEA, including 
Mickey Mouse (2003), Pluto (2005), Goofy (2007) and Donald Duck (2009), 
making the CTEA worth billions to Disney), at 
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1998/nov98/98-11-25.html. 
22 The opponents of the CTEA cut across ideological and other divisions and 
included law professors, libraries, archives, economists and Phyllis Schafly’s 
Eagle Forum, for example.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Eagle Forum Education 
& Legal Defense Fund and The Association of American Physicians & 
Surgeons, Inc. In Support Of Petitioners. 
23 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (holding that Congress acted 
within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in passing 
the CTEA). 
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Warner, the Association of American Publishers, Dr. Seuss Enterprises, 
the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry 
Association of America, the Songwriters Guild of America and a number 
of estates, foundations, representatives or other entities associated with 
prominent composers and lyricists, including Aaron Copland, George 
Gershwin, Ira Gershwin, Bela Bartok, Richard Rogers, Frederick Lowe, 
Arnold Schoenberg and Kurt Weill.24 In contrast, briefs opposing 
upholding the CTEA reflected contributions from law professors,25 
economists,26 libraries and archives and others, including Intel 
Corporation and the Free Software Foundation.27 
24 See, e.g., Trust Brief, supra note 3; Brief for AOL Time Warner as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Eldred v. Ashcroft, Brief of Amici Curiae of 
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.; CCH Incorporated; Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Inc.; The Mcgraw-Hill Companies; Reed Elsevier Inc.; and the 
Software & Information Industry Association In Support of Respondent. 
25 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in Support of 
Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618; Brief Amici Curiae of Copyright Law 
Professors in Support of Petition, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618. 
26 Brief Amici Curiae of Economics Professors in Support of Petition, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (hereinafter, “Economist Brief”). 
27 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of The American Association of Law Libraries, 
American Historical Association, American Library Association, Art Libraries 
Society of North America, Association For Recorded Sound Collections, 
Association of Research Libraries, Council on Library And Information 
Resources , International Association of Jazz Record Collectors, Medical 
Library Association, Midwest Archives Conference, Music Library Association, 
National Council on Public History, Society For American Music, Society of 
American Archivists , and Special Libraries Association, In Support of the 
Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft (discussing the constitutionality of the CTEA and 
its implications for the public domain); Statement of Timothy Phillips in 
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The debate over the CTEA reflects the significant commercial and 
economic interests affected by its terms.  Estimates suggest that extension 
of copyright protection may be valued at as much as $330 million a year 
for copyright holders by 2017.28 While supporters of the CTEA have 
emphasized the incentives that copyright gives to creation of new works, 
much of the discourse of opponents of the CTEA has focused on assessing 
the general impact of copyright duration on the public domain and the 
creation of future works.29 
While general perspectives with respect to copyright rules may be 
instructive, looking at the uses of copyright in specific instances by 
copyright holders can shed light on how copyrighted works are actually 
created, maintained and controlled by their holders.  In addition, the 
dialogue that emerged surrounding the CTEA necessarily entails 
 
Opposition to Copyright Term Extension (discussing the implications of the 
CTEA term extension) , at 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjala/commentary/PhillipsStmt.html. 
28 See Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic 
Values, Congressional Research Service Report 98-144 E (1998) (estimating 
that annual royalties for works that will not enter the public domain as a result of 
the CTEA will be $50 million by 2002 and $330 million per year by 2017 (at 
1997 prices) or $59 million by 2002 and $389 million in 2017 in 2004 dollars).  
Determination of 2005 dollars was made based on the applicable Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) in the years since the year of payment.  Calculations were 
made using the calculation engine at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank 
website at http://minneapolisfed.org/Research/data/us/calc/index.cfm. 
29 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Nadine Farid, Not In My Library: 
Eldred v. Ashcroft and the Demise of the Public Domain, 5 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 15 (2003) (noting disregard for the public domain inherent in 
the CTEA). 
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consideration of the core goals of copyright law in general.  Although the 
goals of copyright law are often discussed in connection with the creation 
of new works, as CTEA opponents have emphasized, copyright has a 
profound influence on the creation of future works and the ability of future 
creators to use existing works.  Consequently, copyright law should be 
constructed to permit borrowing that enables the creation of future works 
as well as provide compensation to creators of prior works on which such 
future works are based. 
In focusing on the general implications of copyright laws, much discourse 
surrounding the CTEA assesses the impact of the CTEA on both copyright 
holders and the public domain.  The extensive commentary surrounding 
the Eldred case, which focused particularly on the constitutionality of the 
CTEA,30 reflects arguments on both sides of the CTEA debate.31 Within 
discourse surrounding the CTEA and Eldred, two particular themes may 
be extracted.  On the one hand, a significant theme emphasized by 
supporters of the CTEA relates to the compensatory aspect of copyright as 
a tool of innovation related to acts of creation that is intended to both 
 
30 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
31 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller & William M. Patry, The 
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. SYMPOSIA (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and 
Freedom of Speech:  Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOYOLA 
L.A. L. REV. 83, 95 (2002) (noting the CTEA violates the First Amendment and prevents 
expression that would otherwise occur); Dan T. Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends 
Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 96 
(2002).  
Copyright on Catfish Row 17 
 Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
incentivize and reward creators. 32 This approach emphasizes the 
incentives that give impetus to potential creators to create new works.33 
In contrast, although often also rooted in the copyright as tool of 
innovation approach, opponents of the CTEA have tended to take note to a 
greater extent of actual behaviors with respect to copyright over time 
periods other than in relation to the moment of creation of a copyrighted 
work.  As such, they focus in greater depth on issues related to control and 
consider some implications of the process by which copyrights are 
actually used over time and the impact of copyright laws on the creation of 
new works.34 This view evident in discourse of CTEA opponents focuses 
 
32 See Davis, supra note 3, at 998-999 (discussing the appeal of heirs of 
individual composers in Congressional hearings who focused on the economic 
losses they would suffer without passage of the CTEA); Gifford, supra note 19, 
at 392-397 (noting that in addition to global competition and harmonization with 
the European Union, “[t]he final rationale cited by supporters of the CTEA is 
that a longer term of protection would serve as a greater incentive for creation of 
artistic and literary works.”); see also supra note 27 and infra note 224 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the arguments of amici curiae for the 
respondents in the Eldred case. 
33 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325 (1989); Hansman & Santilli, supra note 9, at 
___; Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 
167 (1934); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale 
of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); see also Arewa, Strategic 
Behaviors, supra note 15 (discussing the intellectual property as tool of 
innovation approach). 
34 See L. Ray Patterson, Case Comment: Eldred v. Reno: An Example Of The 
Law Of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 238 (2001) 
(noting monopolistic control aspects of early statutes dealing with literary works 
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particular attention on the effect of copyright rules on the public domain.   
Considerations of copyright from both sides of the CTEA debate have 
tended to approach consideration of the issues raised by the CTEA from a 
macro and rule-focused perspective that seeks to delineate the general 
implications of copyright rules for the public domain and creation of new 
works.  Further, much of this discourse largely assumes that the control 
and compensation elements of copyright are necessarily linked.  By 
focusing on the implications of copyright rules in general, such 
commentary does not as a result fully consider the significance of actual 
uses of copyright in relation to the stated rationales for copyright in the 
first place.  In addition, such discourse does not fully take into account the 
extent to which the value of a copyright for its holder may inhere in uses 
of copyright that have little or nothing to do with the creation of new 
works and the implications of this for behaviors evident with respect to 
copyright.35 
Although such general considerations are no doubt valuable, looking at 
specific instances of the uses of copyright can also be instructive.  In the 
music area, looking at both the creation and uses of copyrighted works in 
particular instances can illuminate much about the actual working of 
copyright in specific contexts.  In the case of George Gershwin’s works, 
including the opera Porgy and Bess, such examination can reveal 
something about the origins of Gershwin’s works and his musical 
 
such as the English Licensing Act of 1662); see also supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
35 The Economist Brief, however, did address issues relating to the behavioral 
impact of particular copyright rule structures.  See Economist Brief, supra note 
26, at ___. 
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borrowings,36 the extent to which collaborators and the sources of 
borrowings were compensated or acknowledged by Gershwin and the uses 
of copyright both by Gershwin as well as the entities that have held 
Gershwin copyrights since his death. 
C. Strategic Uses of Copyright 
The ways in which holders of Gershwin’s copyright have maintained, 
enforced and expanded their effect rights reflect general copyright 
strategies used by copyright holders today.  Particularly relevant are the 
strategic business behaviors that increasingly characterize the exercise of 
intellectual property right frameworks.  Such behaviors highlight areas in 
which assumptions and assertions about the goals, purposes and uses of 
copyright do not always fully map onto observed behaviors in the 
copyright realm. 
1. The Complexity of Motivations to Create New Works 
Assertions about the benefits of intellectual property frameworks are 
typically based on an implicit acceptance of the fundamental notion that 
intellectual property frameworks have the beneficial effect of promoting 
innovation. Those on both sides of the CTEA debate appear to accept at 
least in principle the proposition that copyright actually creates incentives 
to create new works, an assumption that is not really empirically 
supported.37 While copyright may provide such incentives to create in 
 
36 Musical borrowing entails the use of existing cultural elements or works in 
creations.  See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1, at ___-___ (discussing musical 
borrowing). 
37 See, e.g., RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE, AND REWARD : AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
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some instances, the actual processes by which new works are created are 
often complex.  The motivations that might be extracted from the behavior 
of George Gershwin, for example, would reflect a composer who was 
inspired by both financial and other considerations.  Although Gershwin 
might have been motivated by money and royalties in some instances, 
particularly with respect to his popular music songwriting, he was also 
clearly impelled to create new works for reasons that had little if anything 
to do with financial considerations and even invested his own money in 
works that had no assurance of financial success.38 This reflects the fact 
that people create new works for a variety of reasons and motivations.39 
21 (2001) (“we still cannot say with any conviction that intellectual property law 
in general, and copyright law in particular, stimulates creativity.  That is no 
argument for not having it but it should sound loud notes of caution about 
increasing it.  And we still know very little about its empirical effects.”); Julie E. 
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights 
Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 505 fn. 160 (1998-1999) (noting that the 
role of copyright in the production of cultural texts remains an unanswered 
empirical question); Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic Justification for 
(and thus Constitutionality of) Copyright Law’s Prohibition Against 
Unauthorized Copying: §106 (January 2003), AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
Related Publication 03-1 (noting that economic justification for copyright 
prohibition against unauthorized copying is not be necessary to stimulate an 
optimal level of new creations and in fact appears to have a net negative effect 
on creative output). 
38 This is particularly true in the case of Gershwin’s later works, including Porgy 
and Bess, which was not a commissioned work and in which Gershwin invested 
his own money.  See John Andrew Johnson, Gershwin’s Blue Monday (1922) 
and the Promise of Success, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE 
MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 111, 111 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999). 
39 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15. 
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In addition, regardless of whether copyrights gives incentives to create a 
work, subsequent to their creation, intellectual property rights such as 
copyright may in fact also be used as strategic weapons in a manner that 
may actually impede the creation of future works.40 
2. Intellectual Property and Strategic Business Behaviors 
Aggressive and strategic behaviors are increasingly associated with the 
use and enforcement of intellectual property rights.41 These behaviors are 
in part a result of the transition in developed countries from a tangible 
industrial production economic paradigm to an intangible paradigm based 
on information technology.42 This move to the digital economy era has 
“increased the stakes in the global dimensions of intellectual property 
rights.”43 Two recent examples of the use of copyright reflect this trend.  
In the case of peer-to-peer file sharing, for example, the Recording 
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) has aggressively pursued 
alleged copyright infringers in large numbers.  By June 2004, the RIAA 
had initiated more than 2,000 lawsuits against alleged file sharers for 
 
40 Id.; see also DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY 
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER (2004) (highlighting the 
fact that intellectual property frameworks have been used historically in the 
international intellectual property arena as a tool of piracy). 
41 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15. 
42 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation in the Knowledge 
Economy: Adopting Disclosure Frameworks for a New Intangibles Age, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Knowledge Economy”). 
43 See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications 
of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENVER J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 109, 119 (1995) Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15; Arewa, 
Knowledge Economy, supra note 42. 
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copyright infringement.44  In another example, following passage of the 
Digital Millenium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”),45 companies 
immediately began to use the DMCA as a competitive weapon for 
purposes that had essentially nothing to do with the creation of new works, 
but more to do with the prevention of competition.46 
These and other examples suggest that aggressive and often strategic 
business behaviors are increasingly a part of the use of copyright and 
 
44 As of June 22, 2004, 2,047 “John Doe” lawsuits had been filed targeting 
groups of suspected copyright infringers.  See Congressional Budget Office, 
Copyright Issues in Digital Media 19 (Aug. 2004), at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf (hereinafter, 
“CBO”); see also Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales (March 2004) (unpublished manuscript, 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar?papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf) (finding that 
file sharing has an effect on music sales that is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero). 
45 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 
28, 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §1201 et seq.). 
46 See FEP, Intellectual Freedom, supra note 21, at 32 (“The DMCA has also 
become a weapon for companies seeking to squelch competition.”); Dan L. 
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L.  REV. 1095, 1110-1114 (2003) 
(noting that under the DMCA strategic behaviors were used to “suppress 
competing technology by preventing interoperability with products that include 
technical protections,” rather than protect innovation or prevent unauthorized 
copying or distribution of copyrighted works); Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, 
Will Fair Use Survive?  Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control, Free 
Expression Policy Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University 
Law School 4-5 (2005), at 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (noting chilling 
effect of DMCA Section 512 takedown letters) (hereinafter, FEP, Fair Use). 
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intellectual property rights in general.  Such behaviors may be exemplified 
by both actual legal actions as well as the threat of legal action through 
licensing letters or cease and desist letters.47 Threats of legal action have 
the potential to cause a chilling effect because allegations of infringement 
may in the end differ little in their effects on the behavior of the party 
deemed to infringe than in cases of actual infringement.48 As a result, 
threats can be important avenues for strategic behaviors.   
Although strategic behaviors are by no means a new phenomenon,49 the 
intangibles paradigm facilitates such behaviors by virtue of the increasing 
divergence between systems of rules (the “rules of the game”) and 
observed behaviors associated with such rules (the “manner of play”).50 
47 FEP, Fair Use, supra note 46, at 4-5, 36-37 (noting potential chilling effect of cease and 
desist letters and other enforcement practices of copyright holders) 
48 See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of 
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 
1030 fn. 78 (1990) (Review of PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW 
AND PRACTICE (1989)) (“At issue here, however, is the chilling effect on artists, 
and artists are not usually copyright experts.  Thus, the fact that a work could be 
a potential infringement is as important in practical terms as actual 
infringement.”); see also Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15. 
49 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15. 
50 Id. (noting difference between rules of the game or formal legal rules and 
regulations that constitute intellectual property frameworks and the manner of 
play, which refers to “how participants subject to such game rules interpret and 
transform these rules in actual play and the implications of such transformations 
for the game and consequently system of rules themselves”); see also Lawrence 
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 947 (1995) 
(“governments, as well as others, act to construct the social structures, or social 
norms, or . . . the social meanings that surround us”); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 17-18 (1984) (“Rules are often thought of in 
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Such rules of the game, which include copyright rules, developed under a 
tangible asset paradigm economic and business model associated with the 
nineteenth and much of the twentieth century.51 Consequently, such rules 
do not always adequately contemplate the reality of behaviors and value 
assignments, including those evident under the intangibles paradigm 
associated with the era of digital copyright.52 This disjuncture between 
rules and practice is by no means limited to the exercise of intellectual 
property rights.  It is also an important aspect of the transition of legal 
rules in the knowledge economy in other legal spheres as well.53 
D. Copyright, Strategic Behavior and Value 
Views that focus on the incentives copyright gives for the creation of new 
works are based on assumptions about how copyright holders derive value 
 
connection with games, as formalized prescriptions.  The rules implicated in the 
reproduction of social systems are not generally like this.  Even those which are 
codified as laws are characteristically subject to a far greater diversity of 
contestations than the rules of the game.  Although the use of the rules of the 
game such as chess, etc. as prototypical of the rule-governed properties of social 
systems is frequently associated with Wittgenstein, more relevant is what 
Wittgenstein has to say about children’s play as exemplifying the routines of 
social life.”). 
51 See Arewa, Knowledge Economy, supra note 42. 
52 Id.
53 Id. at ___ (discussing the implications of the intangibles paradigm for securities law and 
accounting frameworks); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private 
Offerings in the Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 
U. TOL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing some implications of the cyberspace 
era for securities regulation).  
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from copyright.54 Although compensation for creation of a new work may 
be a source of value for copyright holders,55 strategic behaviors suggest 
that the use of copyright reflects a process over time rather than 
necessarily only in relation to a specific moment of creation.56 
Furthermore, copyright holders also derive value from copyright in a 
number of ways in relation to the use of copyright over time that may have 
little to do with the creation of the work itself, but rather in how they can 
expand and manipulate the scope of existing rights through various means, 
including both judicial and legislative enforcement.57 As a result, it is 
likely that prominent copyright holders will again seek to extend the 
length of copyright duration when the twenty-year extension given them 
by the CTEA is close to expiring.58 The actions of such holders highlights 
the strategic behaviors commonly asserted in the intellectual property 
realm today more generally, including through both judicial and legislative 
enforcement. 
1. Strategic Behavior and Judicial Enforcement 
Judicial enforcement may be evident in a number of behaviors, including 
actual suit or the threat of suit, sending of cease and desist letters, suits 
 
54 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“’By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas’”) (citing Harper & Rowe, Publishes, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 
U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) 
55 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-219 (discussing copyright incentives and the nature of 
copyright’s limited monopoly). 
56 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text. 
57 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text. 
58 See Garon, supra note 11, at ___. 
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against large numbers of people as is evident in the case of RIAA suits59 
and the recent Bridgeport cases where some 800 defendants were sued.60  
The recent SCO case illustrates the use of judicial enforcement to expand 
existing rights connected to copyright in a business context.61 The 
ongoing SCO-Linux dispute exemplifies aggressive strategic behavior 
with respect to intangibles. This dispute involves claims by The SCO 
Group,62 with respect to open source Linux technology, which has been 
alleged by SCO to infringe upon copyrights, not actually owned by SCO, 
with respect to proprietary Unix technology.63 SCO’s assertion of rights 
has involved its sending letters to more than 1,500 companies in the 
United States and overseas demanding that these companies pay SCO 
licensing fees on account of their use of Linux.64 These licensing letters 
were followed by several lawsuits, some of which were filed against 
recipients of SCO licensing letters.65 
59 See supra note 43and accompanying text. 
60 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18810 (6th Cir. 
2004); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Boutit, 101 Fed. Appx. 76 (6th Cir. 2004); Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2003); Bridgeport Music, 
Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
61 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (noting that one complication 
in the SCO case relates to accusations that SCO is being used by Microsoft to 
attack open source code Linux technology that Microsoft sees as a threat to its 
proprietary Windows operating system). 
62 The SCO Group (“SCO”) bought its Unix business in 1995.  Unix copyrights were 
explicitly excluded from the transaction.  See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15. 
63 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 for a more comprehensive discussion of 
the SCO-Linux dispute. 
64 Id.
65 Id.
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Judicial enforcement of copyright may involve behaviors that have little to 
do with the creation of new works or the commercialization or distribution 
of such works.  Rather, judicial enforcement efforts may reflect the value 
that may be derived from intellectual property rights that may come from 
the expansion of the effective scope of existing rights instead of the 
creation of new works.66 In addition, such actions are often used by 
companies to signal the value of intangibles to markets.67 
Strategic judicial enforcement may reflect different value assignments 
than the copyright as tool of innovation approach might assume.  Such an 
approach implicitly presumes that the value of a copyright for its holder 
largely rests in some type of commercial exploitation or distribution of a 
work, which is the fundamental basis for accepted views of copyright as 
giving incentives to create new works.  In contrast, strategic uses of 
copyright often reflect a value in copyright derived from utilization of 
copyright with respect to other concurrently or potentially existing rights 
or commercial uses.  Strategic behaviors may consequently be used, for 
example, in the intellectual property arena to block other products or 
 
66 Id. (noting that SCO seeks to enforce rights in relation to Unix copyrights held 
by Novell, which rights SCO may have acquired when Novell sold the Unix 
business to a predecessor company of SCO). 
67 See David S. Gelb & Philip Siegel, Intangible Assets and Corporate 
Signaling, 15 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCOUNTING 307, 321 (2000) (noting 
that as a result of differential accounting treatment of intangibles, companies 
with significant amounts of intangible assets “face the rather formidable task of 
credibly signaling firm value to investors and shareholders”); see also Arewa, 
Knowledge Economy, supra note 42 (discussing failure of accounting measures 
to adequately measure or account for the role played by intangibles today). 
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competitors.68 
By focusing on copyright with respect to acts of creation, the copyright as 
tool of innovation approach does not adequately encompass the range of 
copyright behaviors over time reflected in the manner of play that forms 
an important part of the actual operation of the rules of the game.  
Although judicial enforcement is typically sought with respect to 
individual cases, such enforcement attempts can have broader implications 
for the scope of rights of other copyright holders by virtue of legal 
precedents that might be established in such cases. 
2. Strategic Behavior and Legislative Enforcement 
In addition to using judicial enforcement to expand the scope of 
intellectual property rights through legal action or the threat of such 
action, strategic behavior as is also evident in the legislative arena.69 
68 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15; see also supra notes 45 to 46 
and accompanying text for a discussion of strategic behavior in connection with 
the DMCA. 
69 Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, Court Decisions and Equity 
Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection 19-20 (2004) 
(manuscript on file with author) (finding in empirical study that “excess returns 
to equity are driven, in part, by the breadth of copyright as determined by 
courts,” whereas lengthening of the statutory term provides little incentive due 
to the increased cost of creating derivative works); see also Economist Brief, 
supra note 26 (giving an economic analysis of the CTEA from the perspective of 
CTEA opponents); Liebowitz, Stan J. and Margolis, Stephen E., "Seventeen 
Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and 
Network Effects" [19] (December 2003). http://ssrn.com/abstract=488085 
(noting lack of consideration of “the responsiveness of creative efforts to 
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Another avenue for the use of strategic behaviors with respect to 
intellectual property relates to use of the legislative process to promote 
statutory changes.  Such statutory changes may increase the scope or 
duration of copyright protection with respect to typically broader groups 
of holders than might often be the case in instances of judicial 
enforcement.  Copyright has historically been used by commercial 
interests to promote a legal framework that maximizes the value of their 
investments in copyright.70 
Legislative enforcement may relate to the creation of new rights or 
expansion of existing rights and may affect both new and existing works.71 
As is the case with judicial enforcement, legislative expansion with 
respect to existing and new rights often results in expansion of such rights 
with respect to other potential concurrent users.  In the case of the CTEA, 
the potential users who had less expansive rights as a result of the CTEA 
included potential users of the public domain, borrowers who use existing 
works and those who reinterpret existing works whose scope of rights was 
lessened because of the CTEA. 
 
marginal incentives and the function of ownership of intellectual property 
beyond the incentive to create”). 
70 Jessica Litman, Innovation and the Information Environment: Revising 
Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1996) (“Until 
now, our copyright law has been addressed primarily to commercial and 
institutional actors who participated in copyright-related businesses.”); Arewa, 
Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the role of commercial interests in shaping 
copyright law). 
71 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95, 200 (noting that the 1790, 1831, 1909 and 1976 
copyright acts all applied new copyright terms to new and existing works so that all under 
copyright protection could be “governed evenhandedly under the same regime”). 
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The promotion of statutory changes through legislative enforcement as a 
means to expand copyright protection thus parallels to a large extent the 
strategic business behaviors evident in attempts to seek or threaten judicial 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in business settings.  Both types 
of enforcement may function to expand in effect some aspect of the rights 
that inhere in copyright, including breadth, scope and duration.  The 
activities of the proponents of the CTEA from the copyright industries 
reflect these types of strategic behaviors.  The economic gains to be 
realized from expansion of copyright duration were no doubt a critical 
factor underlying the activities of CTEA proponents.72 
II. THE MUSICAL ORIGINS OF PORGY AND BESS 
Consideration of varieties of strategic behavior in the copyright context 
shines a needed spotlight on the behavioral aspects of copyright 
enforcement.  Such behavioral aspects illustrate the ways in which 
copyright owners maintain, reinforce and at times expand the scope of the 
intellectual property rights held by them.  The uses of copyright by George 
Gershwin and the Gershwin family reflect the uses of copyright for a 
variety of purposes reflecting varied value assignments.  Any 
consideration of creation in the case of Gershwin’s compositions must 
begin with a discussion of the musical origins of George Gershwin’s 
works, including his seminal opera Porgy and Bess.
A. The Creation and Development of the Music and Libretto 
George Gershwin is the most successful and renowned American 
 
72 See infra notes 28 to 29 and accompanying text. 
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composer in American history.73 He had unparalleled popular stature at 
the time of his premature death in 1937, whose impact has been compared 
to John Lennon’s death in 1980.74 His life was the subject of Hollywood 
treatment in the 1945 film Rhapsody in Blue.75 
His success may be measured both in terms of both his artistic and 
financial accomplishments.  Gershwin composed a number of successful 
Broadway musical during his short career.76 The financial success of 
 
73 See THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER xi (Robert Wyatt & John Andrew 
Johnson eds., 2004) (hereinafter, “THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER”) (“During 
his lifetime, George Gershwin (1898-1937) achieved an almost unprecedented 
level of success marked by an international reputation, massive wealth, celebrity 
status, and an uncanny means of attracting attention.”); Charles Hamm, Towards 
a New Reading of Gershwin, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE 
MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 3, 3  (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (“The United 
States has not produced a more famous composer than George Gershwin”); New 
George Gershwin, in __ THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS ___ (Stanley Sadie ed. 2001) (“Remarkably, Gershwin broadened 
his musical scope without sacrificing his popularity.  Free of false modesty, he 
reveled in success, which he accepted as no more than his due.  By the early 
1930s his fame, earning power, and the range of his works made Gershwin 
unique among American composers.”) (hereinafter, “New Grove, Gershwin”). 
74 Susan Richardson, Gershwin on the Cover of Rolling Stone, in THE 
GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 161, 168 
(Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (“His untimely death was felt throughout society, 
causing shock and public grief comparable to that over John Lennon’s death in 
1980.”). 
75 Id.
76 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin left Jerome H. 
Remick & Co., a music publishing firm on Tin Pan Alley, in March 1917 and began 
working as rehearsal pianist for Miss 1917, a show by Jerome Kern and Victor Herbert, and 
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Gershwin’s works did not end with his death in 1937, but rather continued 
to grow.  Porgy and Bess, composed shortly before Gershwin’s death and 
described as a folk opera in its first performances during Gershwin’s 
lifetime,77 did not receive much critical acclaim until well after 
Gershwin’s death.78 The reception of Porgy and Bess typified the 
generally negative critical reception of Gershwin’s more “serious” works 
during his lifetime.79 The value of many Gershwin works, including 
Porgy and Bess, as “serious” music is now increasingly acknowledged.80 
by his 21st birthday had “a Broadway show on the boards, several songs in print, and a 
prestigious publisher awaiting more.”). 
77 See George Gershwin, Rhapsody in Catfish Row, in GEORGE GERSHWIN 72, 
72 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (noting that Porgy and Bess was called a folk 
opera because it was  a folk tale and the music was folk music that was written 
by Gershwin based upon original folk material). 
78 See infra notes 143 to 151 and accompanying text. 
79 JOAN PEYSER, THE MEMORY OF ALL THAT: THE LIFE OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 
193, 214 (1998) (noting that Gershwin was held in contempt by serious 
American composers as well as critics, academics and European conductors). 
80 Larry Starr, Ives, Gershwin, and Copland, Reflections on the Strange History 
of American Art Music, 12 AM. MUSIC 167, 186 (1994) (“Gershwin is at last 
being treated seriously by many”) (hereinafter, “Starr, Art Music”); Hans Keller, 
Gershwin’s Genius, 103 MUSICAL TIMES 763 (1962) (discussing Gershwin’s 
genius); Larry Starr, Toward a Reevaluation of Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess, 2
AM. MUSIC 25 (1984) (discussing musicologist Starr’s surprise at the 
accomplishments of Gershwin in Porgy and Bess after seeing the Houston 
Grand Opera production of Porgy and Bess in New York in 1977); HOLLIS 
ALPERT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PORGY AND BESS: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN 
CLASSIC 5 (1990) (noting initially negative response to what would become 
“regarded as this country’s greatest contribution to opera, and would later 
conquer many of Europe’s most prestigious opera stages”). 
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Gershwin’s works have achieved continuing financial success that is often 
attributed to the appeal of his melodies.81 Moreover, Gershwin’s financial 
success was bolstered by his ability to take advantage of changing 
business structures and technology in the musical arena of his time.82 For 
example, he gave radio performances of his and others’ works,83 which 
helped ensure widespread distribution and public awareness of his 
works.84 In addition, Gershwin was also able to benefit from changing 
industry business structures and the increased financial clout of 
 
81 Steven E. Gilbert, Gershwin’s Art of Counterpoint, 70 MUSICAL Q. 423, 425 
(1984) (“Most of Gershwin’s tunes are indeed memorable.”); Larry Starr, 
Gershwin’s ‘Bess, You Is My Woman Now’: The Sophistication and Subtlety of a 
Great Tune, 72 MUSICAL Q. 429, 430 (1986) (noting that Gerwhsin was “a 
fabulous melodist”); New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (“The 
melodies of Gershwin’s concert works are surely the chief reason for their 
appeal.”). 
82 See George Gershwin, The Composer and the Machine Age, in GEORGE 
GERSHWIN 225, 225-229 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (noting the significance of 
the machine age in influencing everything Gershwin did, from the arts to 
finance, and the fact that composers have been helped by the mechanical 
reproduction of music). 
83 Richardson, supra note 74, at 170 (noting that Gershwin had a radio show 
twice a week); EDWARD JABLONSKI, GERSHWIN 260-263, 276-277 (1998) 
(noting that Gershwin had a radio show called “Music by Gershwin,” the first 
series of which aired twice weekly for 15 minutes on Monday and Friday 
evenings from February to May 1934, and a second series, a half-hour program 
on Sunday night that ran from September to December 1934). 
84 ALEC WILDER, THE AMERICAN POPULAR SONG: THE GREAT INNOVATORS,
1900-1950, at 122-123 (1990) (noting enormous exposure provided to Gershwin 
by radio); Peyser, supra note 79, at 127, 130 (noting that the Gershwins founded 
the New World Music Company, which published all Gershwin works, as a 
subsidiary of T.B. Harms). 
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songwriters who owned their own publishing businesses.  Both Irving 
Berlin and George Gershwin formed their own publishing businesses.85 
Porgy and Bess, which premiered in New York City in 1935,86 depicts the 
life of Porgy, Bess and other African American inhabitants of the fictional 
Catfish Row near Charleston, South Carolina.  Porgy and Bess was based 
on the novel Porgy by DuBose Heyward,87 which Heyward’s wife 
Dorothy transformed into a play that formed the basis of the Porgy and 
Bess libretto.88 Heyward was born in South Carolina of an aristocratic 
family.89 Lacking formal education, Heyward became a cotton checker on 
the Charleston wharves, where he was exposed to African American 
dockworkers and fisherman on whom he based his novel.90 Gershwin first 
approached the Heywards in 1926, but did not actually compose Porgy 
and Bess until after he signed a contract with the Heywards in October 
1932.91 
The collaboration of the Gershwins with the Heywards was an 
acknowledged one in which all parties received copyright credit and 
compensation.  Such acknowledged collaborations, however, tell only one 
part of the story of the creation of musical works such as Porgy and Bess.
Throughout his career, George Gershwin borrowed extensively from other 
 
85 Peyser, supra note 79, at 130. 
86 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Porgy and Bess opened in New 
York in October 1935 in a Broadway theater and not an opera house and ran for 124 
performances, which was not enough to recover the original investment). 
87 Id. at 159. 
88 Id.
89 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 252. 
90 Id.
91 Id.
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musicians and other music, had numerous collaborators, many of whom 
were not acknowledged, received no credit and were given no 
compensation.  The fact of these collaborations reflects the process of 
creation of musical works and is by no means atypical.  Rather, borrowing 
is a norm in the creation of music that copyright law has not yet fully 
confronted.92 How copyright structures interface with musical borrowing 
is a complex question that touches upon broader societal concerns, 
including hierarchies and the relative power and status of the sources from 
which new creators draw both inspiration and material. 
B. Musical Borrowing and Porgy and Bess 
As is often the case in the creation of music,93 Gershwin’s compositional 
technique generally involved extensive collaboration and musical 
borrowing, in his case particularly from African American sources.94 The 
availability for uses in new works of existing works and styles was thus 
crucial to the production of Gershwin’s music.  Examining the processes 
through which Gershwin created his music highlights the borrowing often 
inherent in the composition process and the importance of composers 
being able to draw upon prior works in creating new ones.   
1. Gershwin’s Technical Collaborations 
In addition to collaborating with a number of lyricists, the most prominent 
 
92 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
93 Id. (discussing the pervasiveness of musical borrowing). 
94 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ noting that Gershwin’s concert works draw 
heavily on black American elements). 
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of whom was his brother Ira,95 Gershwin relied extensively on the 
technical assistance of musicians with a better theoretical grounding in 
music.96 Gershwin typically did not give credit to these collaborators,97 
who in some instances provided critical assistance in correcting technical 
inadequacies in Gershwin’s works: 
What made Kay especially valuable was that she had studied 
counterpoint—the discipline that Gershwin lacked . . . She could 
give George sound advice and notate the music he played, an 
enormously time-saving service.  Kay Swift did this not only with 
his songs, but she helped transcribe the three piano preludes, which 
were first performed in December 1926 and published the 
following year . . . Gershwin had to have envied her superior 
musical training.98 
Although Gershwin had classical musical training and was considered to 
 
95 Peyser, supra note 79, at 69 (noting that Ira became George’s full-time lyricist 
in the mid-1920s).  Following George’s death, Ira continued as a successful 
lyricist, working with Kurt Weill and writing the lyrics for a number of films, 
including A Star is Born. See Edward Jablonski, What about Ira? in THE 
GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 255, 259, 
272-273 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (noting Ira’s work on the lyrics of Weill’s 
Lady in the Dark and the film A Star is Born). 
96 Peyser, supra note 79, at 71, 120-121, 194 (noting that at various times, 
Gershwin relied on Will Vodery, James P. Johnson, Kay Swift, Edward Kilenyi 
and Bill Daly for orchestrations). 
97 Id. at 104 (noting that Gershwin did not give credit to James P. Johnson for 
Gershwin’s use of the Charleston rhythm originated by Johnson). 
98 Id. at 120-121. 
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be an excellent pianist,99 part of Gershwin’s technical limitations came 
from the fact that he lacked formal training in music theory and 
counterpoint, having largely ceased piano lessons with Charles Hambitzer 
at age sixteen after he began working in Tin Pan Alley.100 Gershwin’s 
piano style came from his experience making player piano rolls at the 
beginning of his career and African American musicians he watched and 
heard in Harlem.101 In the 1920s, Gershwin began to feel that his musical 
ambitions and creativity were hindered by his lack of technical capacity.102 
As a result, he studied music theory and counterpoint with other teachers, 
including Edward Kilenyi, Henry Cowell and Joseph Schillinger,103 and 
 
99 Charles Hamm, “It’s Only a Paper Moon”; or The Golden Years of Tin Pan 
Alley, in YESTERDAYS: POPULAR SONG IN AMERICA 326, 346, 348 (1983) 
(noting that Gershwin was an excellent pianist who had received a sound 
classical training, a reliable technique and exposure to the music of Bach, 
Beethoven, Liszt, Chopin, Ravel and Debussy from his piano teacher 
Hambitzer). 
100 Peyser, supra note 79, at 31 (noting that Gershwin stopped regular piano 
lessons at sixteen). 
101 Peyser, supra note 79, at 35 (“He got his piano style not only from the player 
piano but also from the black musicians he watched and heard in Harlem.”); 
New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin began 
working for Jerome H. Remick & Co., a music publishing firm on Tin Pan 
Alley, as a song plugger for $15 per week); Hamm, supra note 99, at 346 
(noting that Gershwin cut some 125 piano rolls after 1915). 
102 WILLIAM G. HYLAND, GEORGE GERSHWIN: A NEW BIOGRAPHY 167 (2003). 
103 Peyser, supra note 79, at 158  (noting Gershwin studies with Cowell, who 
may have sent Gershwin to study with Schillinger); Richardson, supra note 74, 
at 164 (noting harmonization, orchestration and form studies with Kilenyi); New 
Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Gershwin studied with a 
succession of teachers, including Rubin Goldmark, Riegger and Cowell). 
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unsuccessfully solicited instruction from the composers Maurice Ravel 
and Arnold Schoenberg.104 His progression from a background in popular 
music practice and immersion in African American musical traditions 
prior to becoming a more “serious” composer influenced his musical 
production.105 
2. Gershwin’s Borrowings of Music and Musical Style 
Popular song from the 1920s to 1950s was far closer to classical music 
than African American music and African American musical elements 
 
104 Charlotte Greenspan, Rhapsody in Blue: A Study in Hollywood Hagiography,
in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 
145, 150 (Wayne Schneider ed., 1999) (noting that Gershwin solicited 
instruction from Ravel and Schoenberg, both of whom assured Gershwin that he 
did not need lessons from them). 
105 See Richard Crawford, It Ain’t Necessarily Soul: Gershwin’s ‘Porgy and 
Bess as a Symbol, 8 YB INTER-AM. MUSICAL RES. 17, 19-20 (1972) (noting that 
Gershwin’s career as a “serious” composer “was launched by the Aeolian Hall 
concert” of Rhapsody in Blue, which reflected his study of “aspects of serious 
composition with private teachers” and Gershwin’s solidifying of ties with 
“serious” music at the same time as he continued to prosper on Broadway); 
Hamm, supra note 99, at 348 (noting that Gershwin was distinguished from 
other Tin Pan Alley songwriters by his involvement in classical music and jazz); 
CHRISTOPHER SMALL, MUSIC OF THE COMMON TONGUE: SURVIVAL AND 
CELEBRATION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSIC 350 (1987) (“George Gershwin is 
a different case altogether, for despite the classical training which he underwent 
in common with many of the other ‘Broadway masters’ of the time, he came as a 
practicing musician to classical composition only after considerable experience 
in Afro-American music; the small number of concert pieces he created before 
his premature death in 1937, and especially his opera Porgy and Bess, give a 
hint of a genuinely popular concert and theatre music, of a kind that Mozart 
would have understood.”). 
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were for the most part assimilated through ragtime, blues, African 
American Broadway musicals and jazz.106 In addition to Porgy and Bess, 
Gershwin composed many pieces of music that reflect significant musical 
influence and borrowing from various sources, particularly African 
American cultural forms. George Gershwin was thus unusual in the extent 
of his reliance on such musical forms.107 His song I Got Rhythm, for 
example, “was full of the accents of ragtime and, to a lesser extent, 
blues.”108 The emphasis on ragtime in I Got Rhythm reflects the fact that 
by the time of Gershwin’s birth, the U.S. was captivated by ragtime 
music.109 Gershwin also actively sought out the opportunity to hear 
African American performers, both closer to home in Harlem during the 
artistic flowering that formed the Harlem Renaissance, as well as in South 
Carolina, where he spent time observing Gullah communities in the South 
Sea Islands during the time that he composed Porgy and Bess.110 In 
 
106 Small, supra note 105, at 277 (“Musically, the popular song from the 1920s 
to the 1950s was much closer to classical music than to black music.  Black 
elements, which, as we have seen, were absorbed in the terms of this century 
from ragtime and from blues as well as through the black Broadway musicals, 
were now also assimilated through jazz, but they remained what they had always 
been – a gloss on what were essentially European closed forms”). 
107 Hamm, supra note 99, at 352 (noting that African American music struck a 
deep responsive chord in Gershwin). 
108 Small, supra note 105, at 277; [hip hop sources] 
109 Peyser, supra note 79, at 38. 
110 See David Horn, From Catfish Row to Granby Street: Contesting Meaning in 
Porgy and Bess, 13 POP. MUSIC 165, 166 (1994) (noting that Gershwin 
holidayed in the Sea Islands and Charleston, observed Gullah folk traditions and 
attended church services where he joined in shouts and heard the calls of street 
vendors); DuBose Heyward, Porgy and Bess Return on the Wings of Song, in 
GEORGE GERSHWIN 34, 39 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938) (discussing George 
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consciously seeking out African American music, Gershwin was 
“schooled and indoctrinated in the African-American musical cauldron 
that was the Harlem Renaissance”111 and was profoundly influenced by 
African American music from his adolescence.112 Gershwin’s music 
emphasized blue notes typically associated with jazz.113 In Rhapsody in 
Blue, for example, “the inventive rhythms, the swinging touch that came 
directly from jazz, brought a quality to the classical-music world that was 
 
Gershwin’s stay in 1934 on Folly Island, a barrier island 10 miles from 
Charleston). 
111 SAMUEL A. FLOYD, JR., THE POWER OF BLACK MUSIC: INTERPRETING ITS 
HISTORY FROM AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES 165 (1995) (citations omitted); 
see also Peyser, supra note 79, at 36 (“’George Gershwin was certainly one of 
the earliest [white songwriters] to seek out black music purely from personal 
interest.  He soaked himself in it.’”); Catherine Parsons Smith, From William 
Grant Still: A Study in Contradictions, in THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER, 147, 
150 (“Gershwin was well known to seek out performances by black 
musicians”); Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (“It should also be noted that Gershwin, 
more than any other composer (or critic, or historian) of his time, constantly 
sought out black musicians and listened to the widest possible range of black 
music.”). 
112 Peyser, supra note 79, at 36; Floyd, supra note 111, at 165 (“Beginning in the 
early 1920s, George Gershwin composed music influenced by and based on 
black musical devices and traits, including the opera Blue Monday Blues (1922), 
the concerto Rhapsody in Blue (1924), and the orchestral tone poem An 
American in Paris (1928).”). 
113 Peyser, supra note 79, at 69 (noting that Gershwin emphasized blue notes or 
intervals of flat thirds and sevenths); Wilder, supra note 84, at 19 (“Long before 
George Gershwin began toying with them, the flatted seventh and flatted third of 
the scale were conventional elements of the blues.”). 
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perceived as genuine freshness.”114 The popularity of Rhapsody in Blue,
composed in 1924, “inspired Gershwin to make extensive study of the 
idioms and characteristics of American folklore.”115 
Gershwin borrowed the piano style of Luckey Roberts, a prominent 
African American pianist in New York City prior to World War I.116 
From Roberts, Gershwin learned drive and syncopation that was at that 
time unknown to most white piano players.117 Judith Anne Still, the 
daughter of William Grant Still, a classically trained African American 
composer, has alleged that Gershwin’s piece I Got Rhythm was stolen 
from her father.118 At a minimum, Gershwin ingested and borrowed 
significantly from African American musical styles and musicians.119 
Further, Gershwin’s talent in playing the piano and style of playing that 
was largely unheard outside of African American musical circles, “gave 
him entry into a more elevated stratum of society than he could have 
entered without it.”120 
114 Peyser, supra note 79, at 84; New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ 
(“The musical juxtapositions of Rhapsody in Blue had roots in a sensibility that 
never fully accepted a separation between popular and classical genres.”). 
115 J. Rosamond Johnson, Emancipator of American Idioms, in GEORGE 
GERSHWIN 65, 66 (Merle Armitage ed., 1938). 
116 Peyser, supra note 79, at 40-41. 
117 Id. at 41 (noting that Robert’s trademark was “a left hand of dazzling speed 
and an idiosyncratic way of playing tremolo with the right.”). 
118 Id. at 43-44 (noting “the very real sense of rage that many blacks continue to feel 
because they believe a language that was once theirs was expropriated from them and 
exploited by whites”). 
119 Id. at 41 (“Gershwin appropriated this from the blacks, ingested it until it was 
his own, and transformed it into his songs.”). 
120 Id. at 42. 
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Gershwin’s composition practice was based borrowing and reflected a  
“synthesis” of elements derived from a variety of stylistic sources.  
Gershwin found inspiration in African American blues and jazz 
styles, Tin Pan Alley idioms, and the languages and forms of 
European art music.  He achieved his synthesis through the 
identification and structural exploitation of musical characteristics 
shared among these diverse traditions.  One example of this is the 
extensive use he made in Porgy and Bess of the relationships that 
can be developed between “blue” thirds (of the type found in blues 
and jazz music) and the kind of modal mixture and harmonic 
complexity associated with late Romantic tonal harmony.121 
3. Musical Borrowing, Musical Collaboration and Porgy and 
Bess 
Gershwin’s use of borrowing in his compositional practice was also 
reflected in Porgy and Bess. In fact, Gershwin’s first opera, Blue Monday 
Blues (1922),122 which used African American musical devices and traits, 
foreshadowed Porgy and Bess.123 During the process of composing Porgy 
and Bess, Gershwin worked closely with the Heywards and his brother Ira, 
who received credit writing the lyrics for some of the songs from the 
 
121 Starr, Art Music, supra note 80, at 170-171 (citations omitted). 
122 Floyd, supra note 111, at 165 (noting African American musical devices and 
traits in Gershwin’s music). 
123 See Hyland, supra note 102, at 158-159. 
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opera,124 while DuBose Heyward received credit for the lyrics of others.125 
Both Gershwin and Heyward were interested in creating an authentic folk 
opera, which resulted in a treatment of African American life that was 
highly unusual in their day in the “serious” music arena.126 Also atypical 
was the reliance of Porgy and Bess on an African American cast,127 a 
decision that was reached after considering having Porgy portrayed by Al 
Jolson in blackface.128 The original Porgy and Bess was drawn largely 
from African American classical singers for whom the opportunity to sing 
classical music in front of white audiences was for the most part new.129 
124 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 263-272 (noting that Ira’s sophisticated 
songwriting style was particularly suited to songs performed by the character 
Sporting Life, a Harlem gambler who drifted into Catfish Row). 
125 Hyland, supra note 102, at 164 (noting that George set many Heyward lyrics, 
including “I Got Plenty of Nuttin’ and “Summertime” to music with few 
changes). 
126 Hyland, supra note 102, at 163 (noting the incongruities of “a Russian Jew 
from the Lower East Side and a white southern aristocrat collaborating to write 
an opera about life in the Negro quarter of Charleston, South Carolina.”). 
127 Peyser, supra note 96, at 229-230 (noting reliance African American cast by 
one earlier “serious” musical work: the Virgil Thomson’s opera Four Saints in 
Three Acts). 
128 Hyland, supra note 102, at 255-258 (noting that Al Jolson actively pursued 
the role of Porgy but was unable to find time to undertake the role and that 
Heyward was initially opposed but soon became resigned to Jolson’s portraying 
Porgy). 
129 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 280-283 (noting that a number of members of the 
cast were students and graduates of the Juilliard school and other conservatories 
who had previously performed in black versions of classical operas and that one 
singer, Edward Matthews, had performed in Thompson’s Four Saints in Three 
Acts). 
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As he composed Porgy and Bess, Gershwin spent time in Gullah 
communities in and around Charleston, South Carolina. 130 Gullah 
communities are rich in cultural traditions and also retain a significant 
number of Africanisms in cultural expression, including language and 
music;131 they thus represented a rich resource from which Gershwin 
could draw.  During his stay South Carolina, Gershwin had the 
opportunity to hear spirituals in churches in the area.132 The music he 
heard in South Carolina shaped Gershwin’s treatment of the storm scene 
in Porgy and Bess, which involves the intertwining of six individual 
prayers that culminates in a traditional spiritual sung in harmony by the 
chorus.133 In addition to borrowing generally from African American 
musical styles and works, Porgy and Bess incorporates the spiritual 
“Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child” in the aria “Summertime.”134 
130 Hyland, supra note 102, at 160 (noting that DuBose Heyward’s mother, 
Janie, was an expert in Gullah culture and dialect); Jablonski, supra note 83, at 
272-276 (discussing Gershwin stay at Folly Island). 
131 See Lorenzo D. Turner, Problems Confronting the Investigation of Gullah, in 
MOTHERWIT FROM THE LAUGHING BARREL: READINGS IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF AFRO-AMERICAN FOLKLORE 126-140 (Alan Dundes ed., 1973) (discussing 
parallels between Gullah and West African languages); Janie Gilliard Moore, 
Africanisms Among Blacks of the Sea Islands, 10 J. BLACK STUDIES 467, ___ 
(1980). 
132 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 274 (noting that Gershwin learned a lot of 
spirituals by going to churches around the area). 
133 Id. at 276 (noting that Gershwin re-created the effect he heard in the churches 
he visited in the storm scene in Act II, Scene 4). 
134 Floyd, supra note 111, at 218 (noting that Summertime involves extended 
troping of this tune, including with respect to the intervallic structure of minor 
and major thirds and major seconds, the rhythm of the spiritual, the spiritual’s 
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Both “Summertime” and “Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child” also 
follow the same harmonic scheme.135 
Gershwin may have borrowed from other sources as well.  Schillinger, 
Gershwin’s music theory teacher, later alleged that he was a major 
contributor to Porgy and Bess.136 Although Schillinger’s contributions to 
Porgy and Bess are not substantiated,137 some of Gershwin’s prior works, 
including Variations on I Got Rhythm and Cuban Overtures, “owed a lot 
to Schillinger.”138 Some passages from Porgy and Bess appear to some 
 
melodic and rhythmic structures as well as beat); Samuel A. Floyd, Jr. Troping 
the Blues: From Spirituals to the Concert Hall, 13 BLACK MUSIC RES. 31, 37-42 
(1993) (discussing Gershwin’s troping of “Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless 
Child” as the first extended troping of the song and describing “Summertime” as 
a “masterful revision of the old spiritual”). 
135 Floyd, supra note 111, at 218. 
136 Hyland, supra note 102, at 167 (noting that Schillinger following Gershwin’s 
death alleged that he had contributed to Porgy and Bess, an assertion rebutted 
vehemently by Ira Gershwin). 
137 Id.
138 Id.; see also Vernon Duke (Dukelsky), Gershwin, Schillinger, and Dukelsky,
75 MUSICAL Q. 119 (discussing the relationship between Gershwin, Schillinger 
and the author, who completed Gershwin’s songs for the film Goldwyn Follies 
following Gershwin’s death); Peyser, supra note 79, at 300 (noting that Ira 
Gershwin completed the songs for Goldwyn Follies with Duke following George 
Gershwin’s death); Paul Nauert, Theory and Practice in “Porgy and Bess”: The 
Gershwin-Schillinger Connection, 78 MUSICAL Q. 9, 12 (1994) (noting that 
Gershwin took 4 1/5 hours of lessons a week for the first year or two of his 
lessons with Schillinger and that Schillinger’s influence on this music is hotly 
debated). 
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commentators to show signs of Schillinger’s influence.139 At a minimum, 
Gershwin’s orchestrations improved significantly as a result of his lessons 
with Schillinger.140 
4. Borrowings and the Reception of Porgy and Bess 
The general tendency of Gershwin to borrow from African American 
cultural expression has significantly influenced responses to Porgy and 
Bess.141 The critical response to Porgy and Bess has tended to be 
influenced by the sources of Gershwin’s borrowings, which prior to the 
1970s led to Gershwin not being accorded the status of a “serious” 
composer.142 The reception of Porgy and Bess has been guided by the 
complexities of the work as “an opera, as folklore, as racial stereotype, 
and as cultural exploitation.”143 
139 See Nauert, supra note 138, at 14 (“A few passages from the opera have 
struck commentators as showing the clearest signs of Schillinger’s influence.  
These include the “fugue” that accompanies the crap game in act 1, scene 2, and 
returns, expanded, during Crown’s murder in act 3, scene 1; the storm/hurricane 
music; the choral background in ‘Gone, Gone, Gone’”) (citations omitted). 
140 Id. at 12 (noting that “virtually all agree that his orchestrations improved 
significantly thanks to Schillinger”). 
141 Crawford, supra note 105, at 24-32 (distinguishing the reaction to Porgy and 
Bess from four perspectives: as an American opera, as American folklore, as 
racial stereotype and as cultural exploitation). 
142 See infra notes 161 to 185 and accompanying text. 
143 Richardson, supra note 74, at 169 (noting complexities of Porgy and Bess 
“and the fact that the opera was ‘not only written, but produced, directed and 
staged by whites, which means that whites reaped the monetary profits of its 
success’”); Crawford, supra note 105, at 23 (noting the complexities of Porgy 
and Bess as a work of “serious” art depicting African Americans in the South 
are reflected in Gershwin’s distance from the authenticity of the original 
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Although Porgy and Bess did receive laudatory reviews during its run in 
Boston,144 critical reviews of Porgy and Bess were at best mixed during 
Gershwin’s lifetime.145 The initial New York run was not successful 
commercially and closed with losses.146 The Gershwin family has 
permitted extensive musical revisions of Porgy and Bess since the time of 
George Gershwin’s death.  For example, the revival of Porgy and Bess 
from 1941 to 1944 was a popular but extensively modified version from 
the one that premiered in New York in 1935.147 The version of Porgy and 
Bess presented to audiences prior to the 1970s, however, was one based on 
cuts made by Gershwin after the Boston run and prior to the New York 
world premiere of the opera.148 By the late 1970s, musicologists and 
 
material and the act of two white men manipulating the imagery of African 
American culture for their own purposes). 
144 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 288 (noting success of the Boston run). 
145 Peyser, supra note 79, at 248 (noting that New York reviewers reacted 
negatively to the cuts made by Gershwin in the opera); Jablonski, supra note 83, 
at 89 (noting that dramatic critics tended to like the production while music 
critics did not). 
146 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 89 (noting that the run closed after 124 
performances in New York); Stanley Green, Oklahoma!: Its Origin and 
Influence, 2 AM. MUSIC 88, 89 (1984) (noting that Porgy and Bess was not 
initially a financial success); Wilder, supra note 84, at 155 (noting that Porgy 
and Bess “lost a good deal of money, and, in general, the opera critics dismissed 
it”). 
147 See Charles Hamm, The Theatre Guild Production of “Porgy and Bess”, 40 
J. AM. MUSICOLOGICAL SOC’Y 495, 497 (1986) (noting the popularity of the 
Cheryl Crawford revival, which reduced the cast and chorus by half and the 
orchestra from 44 to 27 pieces). 
148 See Peyser, supra note 79, at 246-248 (noting cuts made by Gershwin prior to 
the New York premiere); Hamm, supra note 73, at 11 (noting that all versions of 
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critics had begun to reevaluate Porgy and Bess,149 which received the 
imprimatur of the Metropolitan Opera, which performed a version of 
Porgy and Bess in 1985, fifty years after its premiere.150 
In contrast to the general critical response, which has focused on the status 
of Porgy and Bess as a work of art, African American commentary has 
tended to look at the representations of African American culture within 
Porgy and Bess.151 The African American critical response to Porgy and 
Bess has been mixed.  Many performers of Porgy and Bess, including 
William Warfield, have been supportive of the work.152 Others, including 
Duke Ellington and journalist James Hicks, reacted negatively to the 
African American characterizations in Porgy and Bess.153 
5. The Shape of the Public Domain:  Determining the Scope 
of Common Pool Resources 
Like many others, Gershwin borrowed extensively from African American 
 
Porgy and Bess are problematic and that even the Houston Grand Opera 
Company and Metropolitan opera version are based on a score that was 
complete six months before the first performance and thus likely not an accurate 
reflection of Gershwin’s intent since revisions made and approved by him may 
not have been incorporated in this score). 
149 See Hyland, supra note 102, at 176-177. 
150 Id. at 177; see also “Porgy and Bess: An American Voice (PBS ____), at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/gperf/porgy/index.html). 
151 See Horn, supra note 110, at 168 (noting that the debate about aesthetic merit 
and representations of African Americans came into direct contact in a debate in 
Liverpool, England relating to a proposed production of Porgy and Bess). 
152 Id. at 173-174. 
153 Id.
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cultural expression.  As has been true in other cases, borrowings from 
African American traditions and artists have often taken place within the 
context of copyright frameworks that have historically facilitated the use 
without compensation of cultural forms that fall in a lower place in 
sociocultural hierarchies.154 As a result, certain types of cultural 
expression may be treated as a public domain resource available to all, as 
is often the case, for instance, with local knowledge in the context of 
global intellectual property regimes today.155 
In some cases, a tendency to designate particular forms of cultural 
expression a public domain resource may be a result of the fact that the 
source may truly reflect a common pool of resources from which many 
draw inspiration and material.  In such cases, payment of compensation 
for use of such material is often not feasible and likely not desirable, since 
common pool resources are commons that should be generally available to 
all.  Although compensation may not be feasible or desired in such cases, 
attribution to the source of the material would probably be beneficial.  In 
addition, when public domain resources are embedded within copyrighted 
works, care should be taken to ensure that copyright protection does 
eliminate future access to the public domain elements within the 
copyrighted work.  Preventing access to such elements could effectively 
prevent future uses of such public domain material for the duration of 
 
154See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2; see also infra notes 168 to 176 and 
accompanying text. 
155 See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (discussing conceptions of the public 
domain); Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2. 
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copyright protection.156 
In contrast to uses of public domain resources, in other cases, certain types 
of cultural expression may be treated as a common pool resource as a 
result of hierarchies of culture, power and taste.157 Such hierarchies are 
often expressed through and reflected in the operation of copyright law 
structures, which may facilitate the borrowing without compensation of 
cultural expression of certain often disempowered individuals or 
groups.158 The uses of African American cultural expression without 
compensation during the twentieth century have, in some instances, 
reflected the existence and operation of such hierarchies with respect to 
copyright law and its application.  Such uses have included borrowings by 
composers such as Gershwin as well as others, including rock and roll 
musicians, who frequently borrowed from the blues tradition and blues 
artists.159 
156 See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
157 Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2. 
158 Id.
159 See Dixon v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15291(1985) 
(involving suit by blues artist Willie Dixon against the rock group Led Zeppelin, 
alleging that Led Zeppelin’s song Whole Lotta Love constituted copyright 
infringement of Dixon’s song I Need Love); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 2, at 
117-148 (discussing copyright and African American music); Hall, supra note 2, 
at 31-51; Greene, supra note 2, at 357-358 (“Music scholars have noted that 
Black artists, as a class of performers, routinely found their works appropriated 
and  exploited by publishers and managers.  The publishers typically (although 
hardly always) were white.  As a result, Black artists as a class were denied the 
economic benefits of the copyright system.”) (citations omitted); see also 
Arewa, Elvis, supra note 7. 
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Gershwin borrowed both from common pool resources that may be 
considered public domain as well as knowledge that, although treated as a 
public domain resource, was likely not a public domain resource and for 
which compensation could and in some instances perhaps should have 
been paid.  Both types of borrowings are potentially problematic in light 
of the current aggregation of control and compensation within copyright 
law frameworks, which may enable users of public domain resources or 
other existing works to use copyright protection to prevent similar uses of 
their works.  In addition to being highly inequitable, this outcome is 
particularly ironic with respect to Gershwin’s works including Porgy and 
Bess, which contains depictions of African Americans and African 
American culture that were questioned and criticized by even the 
standards of the time of its creation on account of the characterizations it 
included.  Porgy and Bess is also a popular and widespread work and one 
of the few representations of African American culture in the “high” 
culture music sphere.  Gershwin family restrictions on uses of Porgy and 
Bess substantially affects cultural meaning in preventing any 
reinterpretation of this work, which now represents a seminal “high” 
culture depiction of African Americans and African American culture.160 
C. Hierarchies of Cultural Forms and Gershwin’s Works 
1. Porgy and Bess as “Serious” Art 
Although Porgy and Bess has since its creation leapt from the world of 
popular art to high culture,161 the initial response to the opera was rooted 
 
160 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text. 
161 See Hyland, supra note 102, at 178. 
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in pervasive hierarchies of cultural forms.162 Part of the reaction to Porgy 
and Bess and other Gershwin works after the concerto Rhapsody in Blue 
came from the fact that they were difficult to classify within existing 
hierarchies as popular music given their technical attributes.163 At the 
same time, such works did not fit within accepted characterizations of 
“serious” music on account of their being based in vernacular cultural 
forms including those coming from African American traditions.164 
From the nineteenth century onwards, rankings of aesthetic value of 
musical works, or what might be termed hierarchies of taste, have been 
characteristic of evaluations of musical production and have significantly 
influenced the development of copyright frameworks.165 George 
Gershwin’s background and image  
 
162 See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing the role of hierarchies of cultural 
forms in music and other expressive arts). 
163 See Crawford, supra note 105, at 23 (noting that Porgy and Bess is a 
paradoxical work of “opera interlaced with hit songs”); Richard Crawford, 
Gershwin’s Reputation: A Note on Porgy and Bess, 65 MUSICAL Q. 257, 257-
258 (1979) (noting that scholars are uneasy about Gershwin because his music is 
difficult to classify); Carol Oja, Gershwin and American Modernism, 78 
MUSICAL Q. 122, 122 (1994) (noting that Gershwin straddled the divide between 
high and low culture forms); Starr, supra note 81, at 429-430 (noting that 
Gershwin’s “free embrace of influences from popular idioms resulted in music 
with a more conservative harmonic and rhythmic surface than that typical of 
contemporaneous ‘avant-garde’ works” and was also a stumbling block toward 
his music being taken “seriously”). 
164 See Crawford, supra note 105, at 19 (noting that Rhapsody in Blue was 
Gershwin’s “first unclassifiable act as a musician”). 
165 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing hierarchies of taste in hip hop 
music); Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing hierarchies of culture and 
hierarchies of taste with respect to music in the nineteenth century). 
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played out the generalizations that established guardians of 
American high culture found so disturbing.  He grew up as part of 
a Jewish working-class America, straddling volatile racial lines.166 
As a result of his background and musical choices in the context of such 
hierarchies, Gershwin was “regarded either as an outsider or, once 
“inside,” as associated with ‘lower’ art.”167 
2. Insider and Outsider Status, Hierarchies and Copyright 
Gershwin’s simultaneous insider and outsider status meant that he both 
benefited from and suffered as a result of hierarchies of culture.  George 
Gershwin benefited immensely from the existence of such hierarchies.  As 
a white composer whose work involved extensive borrowing from African 
American cultural forms, Gershwin was able to present musical forms 
derived from that tradition in ways not then available to African American 
artists who worked in those idioms.168 Such music, coming from outside 
of the classical tradition, seemed fresh and inventive to those who heard it, 
many of whom were not well acquainted with the context from which such 
music derived.  In addition, hierarchies affected Gershwin’s ability to 
borrow from African American sources without compensation.  This 
ability to borrow reflected the fact that African American cultural 
traditions have been for the most part treated as part of the public 
 
166 Richardson, supra note 83, at 167. 
167 Id.
168 Small, supra note 105, at 331-332 (noting that Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue 
was commissioned by Paul Whiteman, the “self-styled ‘King of Jazz’” as part of 
Whiteman’s effort to make jazz respectable and accessible to white Americans). 
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domain.169 This categorization as a public domain resource enabled 
Gershwin and others to borrow liberally from African American sources 
during much of the twentieth century.  The public domain categorization 
also meant that such borrowings were not deemed copyright infringement, 
highlighting the intimate relationship between the scope of copyright 
protection, power and status.170 
At the same time, Gershwin also suffered from hierarchies of taste on 
account of being Jewish, lacking formal musical training and his 
connection with popular and non-European musical forms.171 
Opportunities for Jewish composers were restricted in the serious music 
realm in Gershwin’s time.172 In addition, a pervasive anti-Semitism is 
evident in some commentary about Gershwin’s music,173 including 
 
169 See Arewa, Piracy, supra note 2 (discussing borrowings from African 
American traditions). 
170 Id. (discussing rock and roll borrowings from the blues tradition); see also 
HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL __ (1984) 
(discussing Porgy and Bess as a paradigm case of the lack of control of African 
Americans over their artistic and cultural destiny); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra 
note 2, at 117-148 (discussing copyright and African American music); Hall, 
supra note 2, at 39-40 (discussing the systematic appropriation of African 
American musical forms; Greene, supra note 2, at 357-358 (commenting on use 
of copyright to appropriate African American music). 
171 See supra notes 122 to 151 and accompanying text. 
172 Peyser, supra note 79, at 222-223 (noting that the 1920s was “the first decade 
in the history of Western music that Jews excluding these converts were even 
allowed to try to enter the exalted field of concert repertoire”); Richardson, 
supra note 74, at 167 (noting Gershwin’s image as part of a Jewish, working-
class, immigrant family who straddled racial lines). 
173 Peyser, supra note 79, at 237-239. 
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composer Virgil Thomson’s review of Porgy and Bess, which referred to 
“gefilte fish orchestration.”174 Further, Gershwin’s family came to the 
United States from Russia, which meant that he fell in a lower place in 
social and cultural hierarchies than Jewish composers from Austrian and 
German backgrounds such as Arnold Schoenberg,175 or American Jewish 
composers such as Aaron Copland, who had studied extensively in 
Europe.176 
3. Gershwin’s Musical Training, Experience and Commercial 
Success 
Gershwin’s music was also denigrated because of his lack of formal 
training in classical theory, particularly counterpoint and orchestration, 
and commercial success.177 Gershwin did attempt throughout his life to 
rectify his formal musical deficiencies through studies with teachers such 
as Joseph Schillinger.178 Gershwin also relied on others throughout his 
 
174 Id. at 248 (noting the smarmy anti-Semitism in Thompson’s remarks). 
175 Id. at 33 (noting that prior to 1915, only German and Austrian Jewish 
composers such as Mendelssohn, Mahler and Schoenberg had established 
successful careers as composers, and that these composers were highly educated, 
assimilated men who had formally converted to other religions) 
176 Id. at 97-99 (noting that Copland became identified as the dean of American 
music despite the far greater popularity and public consciousness of Gershwin’s 
works); Starr, Art Music, supra note 80, at 180 (noting Copland studies in Paris 
with Nadia Boulanger, where “Copland quickly absorbed important elements of 
contemporary European musical styles”). 
177 Peyser, supra note 79, at 57 (discussing gaps in Gershwin’s technical music 
training). 
178 Id. at 197-198. 
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career to do his orchestrations and assist with notation.179 
Gershwin started his musical career at age fifteen,180 first as a pianist and 
later as a piano roll player in Tin Pan Alley in New York City.181 Later in 
his career, as he attempted to move into the realm of serious composition 
within the classical music idiom, Gershwin’s connection with Tin Pan 
Alley, then the center of popular music production globally,182 continued 
to taint his work in the views of classical music critics of the time.183 In 
addition, Gershwin’s syncretic style, which derived much inspiration and 
borrowing from African American and other traditions outside of the 
mainstream European classical tradition, including Jewish scales and 
 
179 Id. at 71 (noting that Will Vodery, an African American friend and colleague 
of Gershwin, orchestrated Gershwin’s short opera Blue Monday Blues); see 
supra notes 95 to 105 and accompanying text. 
180 See Ira Gershwin, My Brother, in GEORGE GERSHWIN 16, 17 (Merle 
Armitage ed., 1938) (noting that George became a piano pounder in Tin Pan 
Alley at age 15 for $15 a week (approximately $287 in 2004 dollars)). 
181 Id. at 31, 33. 
182 Charles Hamm, “After the Ball”; or The Birth of Tin Pan Alley, in 
YESTERDAYS: POPULAR SONG IN AMERICA 284, 285-286 (1983) (discussing 
birth of Tin Pan Alley in New York City in 1880s, which by 1900 controlled the 
popular song industry). 
183 See THE GEORGE GERSHWIN READER, supra note 73, at xi (noting that 
Gershwin was “[l]ambasted by critics for a lack of formal compositional 
techniques”); Larry Starr, Musings on “Nice Gershwin Tunes,” Form, and 
Harmony in the Concert Music of Gershwin, in THE GERSHWIN STYLE: NEW 
LOOKS AT THE MUSIC OF GEORGE GERSHWIN 95, 95 (Wayne Schneider ed., 
1999) (“But from the first reviews of Rhapsody in Blue through the early 
criticism of Porgy and Bess and up to the present day, connoisseurs and 
sophisticates, authorities and would-be authorities on Gershwin have claimed 
that he simply lacked the technique to construct convincing large-scale works.”). 
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motifs, was also often dismissed because of its connection with such 
forms.184 
In the last years of his life from 1932 to 1937, Gershwin was subjected to 
enormous criticism as he attempted to become a more serious composer.  
Gershwin’s enormous commercial success was a continuing hurdle to his 
ambitions since his experience also ran counter to notions that great 
musicians should suffer from deprivation.185 Gershwin’s commercial 
success was both partly attributable to and reinforced by his uses of 
copyright. 
III. THE GERSHWINS, CONTROL AND THE USES OF COPYRIGHT 
A. George Gershwin and the Uses of Copyright 
George Gershwin actively participated in technological transformations in 
music practice and performance associated with the advent of the 
recording industry and radio,186 which were in turn connected to the 
decline in power of music publishers.187 In addition to writing songs for 
 
184 Id. at 97 (“Music in New York in the 1920s was still very much a European 
property . . . [v]irtually anyone who wanted to pursue serious music went abroad 
to study”).  
185 Peyser, supra note 96, at 214-215 (noting the publications of the League of 
Composers rarely referred to Gershwin in other than a pejorative fashion, partly 
because he was so popular). 
186 See Hamm, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that Gershwin was “the first 
American composer whose early career was built largely on the success of sales 
of phonograph records of his songs”). 
187 See Reebee Garofalo, From Music Publishing to MP3: Music and Industry in 
the Twentieth Century, 17 AM. MUSIC 318, 336 (1999) (noting that records 
becoming a staple of radio programming was the basis of records displacing live 
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Tin Pan Alley and Broadway musicals, Gershwin also wrote songs for a 
number of Hollywood films.188 Gershwin’s involvement in popular and 
commercial music likely made him more conscious of the value of 
copyrights. In fact, Gershwin’s uses of copyright anticipated twentieth-
century “popular music figures in his dealings with a new and 
immediately complicated music business that embraced both 
technology—whether in print, recording, or film—and attendant legalities, 
such as royalties.”189 As a result, in addition to forming his own music 
publishing company,190 he “always insisted on receiving a full 50% 
interest in a composition, even when two lyric writers contributed to the 
song, each lyric writer in such an instance sharing the other 50% interest 
equally.”191 In other instances, it has been asserted that George and Ira 
Gershwin replaced Ira when Ira was not available with a lyricist who 
would be more accommodating and who would permit Ira to retain all 
rights.192 
performers in radio broadcasting and record companies’ displacing publishing 
house as a power center). 
188 Peyser, supra note 96, at 180-181, 258-290 (noting that George and Ira 
Gershwin relocated to California in August 1936 to write songs for Hollywood 
movies). 
189 Richardson, supra note 74, at 169. 
190 Peyser, supra note 96, at 127 (noting that George and Ira formed the New 
World Music Company, which published all Gershwin works with profits going 
two-thirds to George and one-third to Ira, as a subsidiary of T.B. Harms). 
191 AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 431 (3d. ed., 2002). 
192 Peyser, supra note 96, at 123 (noting that Howard Dietz claims that the 
Gershwins selected him rather than P.G. Wodehouse to fill in for Ira when Ira 
had an appendectomy and was unavailable for six weeks because he would be 
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B. The Role of Artistic Legacies as Business:  Control of the Post-
Mortem George Gershwin Artistic Legacy 
The Gershwin family has exerted significant control over Gershwin’s 
musical legacy and image since his death.193 Moreover, with one 
exception, all Gershwin biographers have had close ties to members of the 
Gershwin family.194 A focus on control has been an integral part of 
Gershwin family management of George Gershwin’s estate, particularly 
with respect to copyrights, permissions and royalties.  The Gershwin 
family’s actions with respect to George’s legacy reflect the post-mortem 
development of industries connected to popular figures that thrive and find 
new life even in the death of the figures upon which they are based.195 
The legacies of famous artists may be even more valuable after death than 
they were during the artist’s lifetime,196 which has important implications 
for copyright.  Since copyright terms were originally much more limited in 
duration,197 the role of heirs and other legal successors following the death 
of copyright holders was not typically as pertinent an issue.  Today, 
however, with copyright extending for a generation after the death of 
 
more accommodating than Wodehouse about rights and would permit Ira to 
retain all the credit and money). 
193 See Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (noting that understanding of Gershwin’s 
music has been hindered by family intervention after his death). 
194 Id. at 8. 
195 See David Wall, Reconstructing the Soul of Elvis: The Social Development 
and Legal Maintenance of Elvis Presley as Intellectual Property, 24 INT’L J. 
SOCIOLOGY L. 117, 119 (1996) (noting the development of the Elvis industry 
within hours of his death). 
196 Id.
197 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95, 200 (discussing duration of prior copyright 
statutes). 
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creators, the role of copyright holder legacies as a business is increasingly 
visible and important.  The tension between artistic practice and artistic 
legacy is by no means limited to deceased creators.198 Death, however, 
ends the artistic practice side of the equation and tends to remove the 
artistic legacy from its origin in the artistic practice that originally 
generated the legacy.199 Artistic legacy is an intangible that may also be 
protected by the right of publicity.200 The role of right of publicity with 
respect to artistic legacy was raised in the case Gershwin v. The Whole 
Thing Co.,201 which related to an unauthorized stage performance of music 
by the George and Ira Gershwin.202 
Further, as has been the case with the post-mortem Elvis empire,203 the 
reified images of creators promoted by artistic legacy businesses is at 
times in tension with the creators themselves, whose “artistry and 
 
198 Id. at 120 (discussing contradiction in the artistic activities of the Rolling 
Stones who strive to create new material but whose audience demand old songs 
that are identified with the image of the group 30 years ago). 
199 Id. (“In the long term, death or dissolution of partnership or artistry has the 
effect of rarefying the artist and alienates the abstract image from its physical 
origin, it also encourages reification.”). 
200 Id. at 122, 124-133 (discussing the right of publicity in Elvis cases); Arewa, 
Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (discussing implications of intangibles for 
strategic behavior). 
201 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *12 (C.D. Cal., 1980) (discussing grand 
rights and finding that a producer would need grand rights to the extent that a 
performance tells a story or is “performed with dialogue, scenery, or costumes”). 
202 Id. at *3 (noting that Ira Gershwin alleged in a suit that license was needed 
because “the music publishers did not possess sufficient rights of copyright for 
the dramatic live stage production of ‘Let's Call the Whole Thing Gershwin’ and 
because Mr. Gershwin's rights of publicity would be invaded”). 
203 Wall, supra note 195. 
Copyright on Catfish Row 61 
 Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
ambitions often cause them to develop their artform in directions different 
to those which made them popular.”204 This tension was particular evident 
in Gershwin’s case in the last years of his life as he strove to develop his 
music in a direction that diverged significantly from the work that made 
him so popular. 
As is the case with other business interests, controllers of copyright artistic 
legacies actively advance their strategic interests to a great extent by the 
same means as businesses do more generally.  Consequently, such holders 
are typically less connected to acts of creation than was the case during the 
life of the creator.  This dynamic is evident in the Gershwin case in the 
activities of the Gershwin family, who has played a significant role in 
shaping depictions of George Gershwin and his music following his 
death.205 In the case of the Gershwins, maintaining respect for the 
Gershwin image and music has been a key priority in controlling uses of 
Gershwin copyrights.206 
The business activities of cultural legacies have significant implications 
for copyright by virtue of the sources from which such legacies derive 
value.  Such sources of value are often not adequately contemplated in 
existing copyright discourse.  As a result, understanding the business 
structure and operation of artistic legacies is important for understanding 
how such legacies interact with copyright frameworks today. 
 
204 Id. at 119-120. 
205 Peyser, supra note 79, at 86 (noting that Ira Gershwin and his wife Leonore, 
jealously guarded his position during George’s lifetime and in the manipulation 
of history after his death). 
206 See Gershwin v. Whole Thing, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *5 (“Mr. 
[Ira] Gershwin has always endeavored to preserve the public respect for the 
Gershwins and their music.”). 
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C. Businesses Structures in Copyright Artistic Legacy Maintenance 
1. The Gershwin Trusts 
In the case of the Gershwin family, control of the copyrights for both 
George and Ira is administered by a series of trusts established after 
George’s death.207 A number of trusts administer the copyrights of 
George and Ira Gershwin, including The George Gershwin Family Trust 
(the “George Gershwin Trust”), which administers certain rights in the 
works of George Gershwin,208 and The Leonore S. Gershwin Trust for the 
Benefit of the Ira and Leonore Gershwin Designated Philanthropic Fund  
(the “Gershwin Philanthropic Trust”) and The Leonore S. Gershwin Trust 
for the Benefit of the Library of Congress (the “Gershwin LOC Trust”), 
both of which derive revenue solely from the copyrights of Ira 
Gershwin.209 All three Gershwin trusts support the arts and the creation of 
new works.210 
The Gershwin LOC Trust has the specific mission of protecting and 
preserving “the musical history of Ira Gershwin” and managing the assets 
 
207 Peyser, supra note 79, at 297-298 (noting that George Gershwin never 
regained consciousness after surgery for a brain tumor and did not appear to 
have considered or planned for his own death); New Grove, Gershwin, supra 
note 73, at ___ noting that George Gershwin died on the morning of July 11, 
1937 after emergency surgery for a brian tumor and was buried in Mount Hope 
Cemetery, Hasting-on-Hudson, New York, following memorial services in New 
York and Hollywood). 
208 See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at Addendum, 2a. 
209 Id.
210 Id.
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of the trust to “support the Library of Congress.”211 The Gershwin 
Philanthropic Trust provides support “for artistic organizations, education 
for children in the arts and certain medical facilities.”212 
2. The Gershwin Family and Control of Copyright and 
Artistic Legacies by Heirs 
a. Control of Artistic Legacies 
The combination of control and compensation in copyright is particularly 
problematic in the case of heirs and other legal successors to copyright 
interests.  Copyright is often viewed as an incentive to reward creation.213 
Even if aggregating control and compensation makes sense while a 
composer is alive, justifying this combination in the case of heirs is not 
quite the same.  After the creator’s death, strategic uses of copyright 
inevitably become paramount because at this point copyright can no 
longer be seen as connected to incentives to create in most instances since 
new works from the deceased creator could only come from works that 
were either undiscovered or unpublished prior to the creator’s demise.   
 
211 Gershwin LOC Trust 2002 Report, Guidestar EZ.com, available at 
http://www.guidestar.org/controller/searchResults.gs?action_gsReport=1&npold
=394324 (summarizing figures derived from the Gershwin LOC Trust 2002 IRS 
Form 990 Filing). 
212 Gershwin Philanthropic Trust 2002 Report, Guidestar EZ.com, available at 
http://www.guidestar.org/controller/searchResults.gs?action_gsReport=1&npold
=450500 (summarizing figures derived from the Gershwin Philanthropic Trust 
2002 IRS Form 990 Filing). 
213 Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 326 (“Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of 
limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in 
the first place.”). 
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With popular writers, however, an option does exist by which a popular 
writer’s works may be written after the writer’s death by others.  This is 
the case with the works of Robert Ludlum, for example, whose popular 
fiction works featuring the character Jason Bourne have recently been 
continued by Eric Van Lustbader, whose book The Bourne Legacy was 
published in 2003, some two years after Ludlum’s death in March 2001.214 
This particular avenue is probably not as readily available to music 
composers or songwriters,215 although the post-mortem repackaging of 
compilations of works of artists such as Elvis Presley, Jimi Hendrix and 
others may be the closest equivalent in the music context.216 
The extent to which control of copyright by heirs is an aspect of creators’ 
incentives to create may be an unanswered empirical question.  Heirs and 
legal successors are in most instances not creative.217 Constructing an 
argument that justifies continued control of copyrighted works by heirs on 
the grounds of giving incentives to create is far more tenuous that such 
justifications in relation to creators.  Moreover, even in the case of creators 
themselves, little empirical evidence actually supports the notion that 
copyright gives incentives to create.218 Even if leaving assets to heirs does 
create incentives to create new works, it is not clear that copyright law 
 
214 See ERIC VAN LUSTBADER, THE BOURNE LEGACY (2003). 
215 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing differences in the application 
of copyright to literature and music). 
216 [cite example compilations] 
217 See Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, 
Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 199 
(2002) (noting that with the CTEA, “Congress acceded to the demands of 
noncreative heirs and assignees of old but unexpired copyrights”). 
218 See supra notes 38 to 42 and accompanying text. 
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structures as they currently exist is the appropriate way to do this given the 
need to balance the public interest in copyright.219 The desire to leave 
assets to heirs as an incentive to create lends support to the idea that 
compensation and control within copyright structures should, at least in 
some instances, be disaggregated.  The role of heirs in copyright touches 
upon the sources of value that legal successors derive from copyright 
protection and the differences between where they and creators may derive 
value. 
b. The Value of Artistic Legacies 
The value that estates of deceased artists and heirs derive from exercise of 
copyright likely has nothing to do with creation and may even be far 
removed from issues of musical integrity.  This has been clearly evident in 
the Gershwin case.  In contrast to George Gershwin’s insistence on 
playing his own music or controlling performers who played his music,220 
the Gershwin family has “tended to authorize performances that gave the 
most promise of financial return or favorable publicity, with less regard 
for quality or integrity.”221 Since no new works are likely to emerge, at 
least in any quantity, estates have potentially significantly different 
interests in the rights that inhere in copyright.  As a result, in the case of 
estates in particular, factors that could be termed strategic, including the 
extraction of revenues and control over image are often a predominant 
 
219 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-16 (_____________). 
220 Hamm, supra note 73, at 10 (noting that George Gershwin either performed 
his music himself or insisted on “certain controls over other performers who 
wanted to play his music”). 
221 Id.
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focus.222 The Gershwin family, for example, has focused on controlling 
all images disseminated about both Ira and George Gershwin to the extent 
of refusing to release photographs unless stubble was airbrushed from 
their portraits.223 
The role of estates is increasingly relevant since copyright duration now 
extends far beyond the life of the original creator.  Use of copyright by 
heirs thus brings attention to the control and compensation rights within 
copyright as well as the fact that the control rights of copyright do not fit 
well within the incentive model of copyright in this particular context.  
Although control of copyrighted works may be desirable for reasons of 
image and reputation, it is not clear that copyright should be a mechanism 
for this, particularly since this really has little to do with the creation of 
music.  In the debate concerning the CTEA, heirs were quite active in 
asserting their economic interests in term extension, citing the fact that 
widows, children and legal successors would be harmed by a declaration 
of the CTEA to be unconstitutional.224 The strategic uses of copyright by 
heirs are rooted in the economic value of streams of licensing revenues 
from copyright protected works.  The economic value of such revenues 
 
222 See Wall, supra note 195 (discussing the maintenance of the Elvis Presley 
artistic legacy). 
223 See Peyser, supra note 232, at 23. 
224 See Brief Amici Curiae of Amsong, In Support of Respondent 2 (“It is the 
widows, children and legal successors of the creators of these treasures [such as 
Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue and Cole Porter’s Let’s Do It (Let’s Fall in Love) 
that would fall into the public domain without the CTEA] who would be harmed 
if the CTEA is declared unconstitutional.”). 
Copyright on Catfish Row 67 
 Draft of 9:28 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
can be immense and can be greatly magnified after creators’ deaths.225 
3. The Value of Gershwin’s Works 
The value of Gershwin’s works was high during his lifetime and only 
increased following his death.  Gershwin was quite commercially 
successful during his lifetime and earned significant amounts of money for 
many of his more popular works.  Gershwin’s first hit song, Swanee, was 
recorded by Al Jolson in 1920 and earned Gershwin $10,000 in 
composer’s royalties in 1920 alone (approximately $_____ in 2004 
dollars).226 The piano concerto Rhapsody in Blue, which was composed 
on commission, earned Gershwin more than $250,000 between 1924 and 
1934 (approximately $2.77 to $3.53 million in 2004 dollars) from 
permissions and sales and rentals of the score.227 Gershwin received 
$50,000 in 1930 (approximately $567,000 in 2004 dollars), for example, 
 
225 This is evident in the case of Elvis Presley, whose bankrupt estate was said to 
be worth less than $500,000 at the time of his death and whose value was greatly 
augmented by the Presley estate’s gaining of control over finances and control 
of the Presley image and name.  See Wall, supra note 195. 
226 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___. 
227 Peyser, supra note 79, at 86 (noting that Gershwin received $250,000 during 
the first 10 years of publication of the T.B. Harms two-piano version of 
Rhapsody in Blue despite the fact that both parts were exceptionally difficult to 
play); Richardson, supra note 103, at 170 (noting that Gershwin earned more 
than $250,000 between 1924 and 1934 for Rhapsody in Blue); New Grove, 
Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (noting that Rhapsody in Blue was composed 
and performed for a well publicized concert organized by dance band leader 
Paul Whiteman and was first performed on February 12, 1924 in a concert billed 
as “An Experiment in Modern Music.”). 
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for the use of Rhapsody in Blue in the film King of Jazz.228 In addition to 
royalty income, Gershwin commanded significant fees for his songwriting 
work.  In 1930, for example, he and his brother earned fees of $100,000 
(approximately $1.13 million in 2004 dollars) for the film Delicious and in 
1932 they received $100,000 (approximately $1.38 million in 2004 
dollars) for the Broadway musical Of Thee I Sing,229 which won a Pulitzer 
prize for drama.230 Gershwin would also have earned royalties from the 
publication of sheet music for such works.  Some of the Gershwin 
Broadway productions were also financially successful.  Of Thee I Sing 
ended its Broadway run with a gross of more than $1,400,000 
(approximately $15.88 million in 2004 dollars).231 
At the time of his death in 1938, Gershwin’s estate was listed at $430,841 
gross (approximately $5.79 million in 2004 dollars) and $341,089 net 
(approximately $4.58 million in 2004 dollars).232 Gershwin’s works 
continued to be valuable after his death.  The value of Gershwin’s works, 
from a licensing perspective, has increased in recent years.  In 2002, a 
nationwide license of a Gershwin work was valued at $250,000, an 
increase from a value of $45,000 to $75,000 fifteen years prior to that 
 
228 Jablonski, supra note 83, at 183. 
229 The figures for Delicious and Of Thee I Sing reflect the amounts for both 
George and Ira, who split fees two-thirds to one-third.  See Peyser, supra note 
79, at 127, 180, 196. 
230 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 76, at ___. 
231 Id. at 196. 
232 See Peyser, supra note 79, at 298 (noting that the value of specific pieces in 
the residuary estate included Rhapsody in Blue ($20,125), An American in Paris 
($5,000), Of Thee I Sing ($4,000), Concerto in F ($1,750) and Porgy and Bess 
($250)). 
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time.233 Rhapsody in Blue became United Airlines theme song for 
$500,000.234 
Today, close to 70 years after George’s death and some 20 years after Ira’s 
death, the Gershwin family trusts continue to realize significant revenue 
streams from George and Ira Gershwin copyrights.  In the case of the 
Gershwin Philanthropic Trust and Gershwin LOC Trust, which relate to 
Ira, for example, trust revenues were in excess of $6 million each or close 
to $13 million in aggregate between 1998 and 2002 as reported on trust 
IRS Form 990 filings.235 In addition to garnering significant revenues 
from uses of copyrighted works, the Gershwin family significantly 
 
233 See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 29; David D. Kirkpatrick, Media; 
Publishers and Libraries Square Off Over Free Online Access to Books, NY 
TIMES, June 17, 2002, at C7; John J. Fialka, Music: Songwriters' Heirs Mourn 
Copyright Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at B1 (noting that a nationwide 
license for a Gershwin song went for between $200,000 and $250,000 in 1997, 
in contrast to the $45,000 to $75,000 the license would have cost 15 years prior 
to that time). 
234 Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 29; Fialka, supra note 233, at B1 (noting the 
soaring value of old songs and fact that three companies, AT&T Corp., Ford 
Motor Co. and Farmers Insurance Group, were “currently running television ads 
featuring songs written by the Gershwins”). 
235 The exact figures for this time period for the Gershwin Philanthropic Trust 
are $6,332,724 (revenues), $7,720,696 (expenses), $4,769,089 (average assets), 
$3,594,948 (grants and allocations) and $932,605 (compensation of officers and 
directors).  See Form 990 Filings of The Gershwin Philanthropic Trust, 1998-
2003.  Figures for the Gershwin LOC Trust are $6,450,098 (revenues), 
$6,835,189 (expenses), $3,925,999 (average assets), $136,399 (average 
liabilities), $3,185,275 (grants and allocations) and $932,605 (compensation of 
officers and directors).  See Form 990 Filings of The Gershwin LOC Trust, 
1998-2003. 
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controls the use and interpretation of such works. 
D. Control of Porgy and Bess 
Porgy and Bess is one of George Gershwin’s greatest achievements and 
constitutes his magnum opus.236 In addition to being Gershwin’s last 
major work, Gershwin described Porgy and Bess as a “labor of love.”237 
Since Gershwin’s death, the Gershwin family has closely controlled 
performances of Porgy and Bess, particularly with respect to casting.  
Porgy and Bess illustrates a number of different ways in which the control 
aspects of copyright may be manifested, including issues connected to 
control by heirs, control of future performances of works, control of 
reinterpretation of works and control of future borrowings from works. 
1. Control by Heirs:  The Gershwin Trusts and Family 
Control 
Control of copyright by heirs is increasingly important given the current 
length of copyright terms.  The most recent copyright term extension 
intensifies the influences of heirs on the exercise of copyright.  As a result, 
any consideration of the use of copyright should consider how heirs use 
copyright, both in terms of control of future borrowing, performances and 
reinterpretations and with respect to strategic expansion of existing rights. 
The Gershwin trusts were not surprisingly strong proponents of the CTEA 
 
236 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 111 (noting that Porgy and Bess is among 
Gershwin’s greatest achievements and certainly constitutes his magnum opus); 
Crawford, supra note 105, at 21 (describing Porgy and Bess as Gershwin’s 
magnum opus). 
237 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 111. 
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and participated in a brief for Eldred.238 As was the case with Disney, 
George Gershwin’s works would have entered the public domain in the 
next few years without the 20-year extension given under the CTEA.239 In 
addition to assuring such heirs continued streams of licensing revenues for 
a longer period of time, however, the CTEA also permits continued 
control of copyright protected works for uses and purposes that have little 
to do with the creation of new works.   
2. Controlling Borrowing:  The Irony of Gershwin Family 
Restrictions   
Copyright control aspects often serve to limit future uses of copyrighted 
works, which is ironic in the Gershwin case given the extent to which 
Gershwin used musical borrowing as an indispensable part of his 
compositional style.240 Current copyright standards significantly restrict 
borrowing and uses of existing works unless such borrowings or uses fall 
within an exception that may rebut a charge of copyright infringement.  
Existing exceptions include fair use and de minimis use.241 In this 
manner, copyright protection substantially privileges incumbents, who are 
permitted to borrow while restricting others from borrowing or using their 
 
238 See Gifford, supra note 19, at 385 (“Other notable lobbyists included the 
Gershwin family, whose copyright on George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue”” 
was due to expire.”).  
239 See Sabra Chartrand, Patents; Congress Has Extended its Protection for 
Goofy, Gershwin and Some Moguls of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, 
at C2 (noting that at the time of adoption of the CTEA, the songs of Ira and 
George Gershwin were scheduled to lose copyright protection in the next few 
years). 
240 See supra notes 93 to 140 and accompanying text. 
241 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1, at ___. 
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copyrighted works in the future to create new works.  With the current 
long duration of copyright, the inclusion of control features within 
copyright are increasingly problematic, which is reflected in the assertions 
of opponents of the CTEA about the influence of current copyright 
duration on the public domain. 
3. Controlling Performances:  The Gershwin Trusts and 
Racial Casting 
Control of future performances is another aspect of the exercise of control 
by copyright holders.  With respect to Porgy and Bess, the control aspect 
of the exercise of copyright by the Gershwin family is most evident in its 
control of the manner of Porgy and Bess performances.  The George 
Gershwin Trust closely controls casting of Porgy and Bess by stipulating 
that certain performances of Porgy and Bess be performed such that 
characters in the opera that are black must be cast with black singers:242 
242 Although many discussions indicate that the Gershwin family requires an all 
black cast, this is not actually entirely true because Porgy and Bess includes 
characters such as Archdale that are not black.  See Gail Russell Chaddock, 
When Is Art Free? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1998, at B1 (noting racial 
casting); see also Garon, supra note 13, at 595-596 (“When Washington’s 
Shakespeare Theater decided to cast a white actor, Patrick Stewart, as Othello 
along with an all-black cast last year, they didn’t need permission from 
Shakespeare’s heirs, because the play was already in the public domain.  But a 
theater group wanting to perform Porgy and Bess with an all-white cast could 
not, because the Gershwin Family Trust stipulates that the work can be 
performed only with an all-black cast.”) (citing Chaddock, supra); Symposium, 
Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 808 (2003) (noting Gershwin estate 
requirement that Porgy and Bess have a cast that is all black); Christine Quintos, 
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For example, even when Mr. Gershwin licenses the full grand 
musical play “Porgy and Bess,” he demands that each performance 
meet a number of requirements.  One such requirement is that the 
play be performed by a Black cast and a Black chorus.  The reason 
for this is quite simple.  George and Ira Gershwin created “Porgy 
and Bess” to be a musical play about Southern Blacks.  Today, Mr. 
Gershwin demands of companies, including the New York 
Metropolitan Opera, that their non-Black contract players be paid 
not to perform in productions of “Porgy and Bess” and that they be 
replaced with Black actors and actresses.243 
The Gershwin family is able to enforce this stipulation by virtue of the 
control rights given them within copyright structures and their typical 
retention of grand rights.244 Whether such racial casting is appropriate is 
an ongoing dialogue among singers and other musicians.  Simon Estes, the 
African American bass-baritone, who was not cast as Wotan in the 
Wagner opera Parsifal because he is African American, has stated that he 
“considers the all-black cast stipulation a disservice both to ‘Porgy and 
Bess’ and the cause of integration.”245 The Porgy and Bess stipulation 
 
Case Notes and Comments: Congress’ Green Monster: Copyright Extension and 
the Concern for Cash over the Propagation of Art, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. 109 (2002) (noting creative control of Gershwin Family trust over Porgy 
and Bess in allowing only an all African American cast to perform the play). 
243 Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9. 
244 Id. at *11-12; see also infra note 246. 
245 Anthony Tommasini, All-Back Casts for “Porgy”? That Ain’t Necessarily 
So, NY TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at E1 (noting the Gershwin estate stipulation that 
Porgy and Bess be performed by an all black cast, noting the difficulties in 
assembling such casts and interviewing African American bass-baritone Simon 
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does not apply to concert versions of the opera, but only staged versions.  
In some instances, the Gershwins have transferred rights to some songs to 
music publishers, particularly with respect to small performing rights or 
nondramatic rights.246 As a result, a concert performance of Porgy and 
Bess would not be subject to the casting restriction.  In contrast, a staged 
performance of Porgy and Bess with costumes would require a license 
from the Gershwins even if performing rights or nondramatic rights had 
been transferred to music publishers, because in such an instance, grand 
performing rights (grand rights or dramatic rights) would be needed.  The 
Gershwins have typically retained such grand rights.247 The racial casting 
restriction in Porgy and Bess has led to Porgy and Bess serving as a 
springboard for many African American classical performers, including 
Leontyne Price and William Warfield,248 who performed Porgy and Bess 
early in their respective careers.  Regardless of whether racial casting is 
justified, such control is clearly not an essential or necessary feature of 
copyright.249 Further, the use of copyright evident in Porgy and Bess, as is 
 
Estes, who discusses the refusal of an opera director to cast him as Wotan in 
Wagner’s opera Parsifal because he is African American, and who “considers 
the all-black cast stipulation a disservice both to “Porgy and Bess” and the cause 
of integration”). 
246 Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *___. 
247 See Gershwin v. Whole Thing, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *11-12. 
248 David Schiff, The Man Who Breathed Life into ‘Porgy and Bess’, NY TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2000, at 35 (discussing the New York City Opera production of Porgy 
and Bess and noting that the opera has “served as a springboard for the careers 
of so many great black singers, including Todd Duncan, William Warfield, 
Leontyne Price, Donnie Ray Albert, Clamma Dale and Wilhelmenia Fernandez). 
249 See Tommasini, supra note 245 (noting that “if nontraditional casting is 
going to work, it has to be applied to all operas, ‘Porgy and Bess’ included). 
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true of many strategic uses of copyright, may actually undermine the 
public interest side of the copyright balance. 
4. Controlling Reinterpretation:  The Implications of Casting 
Control 
Racial casting is just one illustration of the type of creative control that 
copyright permits with its current framework that combines control and 
compensation.250 Racial casting also touches on the meaning of cultural 
texts and whose interpretation should govern uses of such texts.  Current 
copyright structures give copyright holders the ability to impose unitary 
meanings of their determination on copyright protected material that they 
control.  In the case of heirs, those who control copyright and artistic 
legacy following the death of a creator often have the right to impose their 
preferred meanings with respect to uses of protected texts.  In either case, 
the control aspect of copyright has potential to stifle seriously the creation 
of future works by preventing current creators from using copyright 
protected works for their new creations as well as suppress alternative 
interpretation of existing texts.251 Such suppression of alternate 
interpretations may actually be a disincentive to the production of future 
works and have the potential to create a chilling effect on artistic 
 
250 See Gerald Nachman, Letter, Let’s Say Enough to Corporate Welfare, NY 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at ___ 
251 See Ida Shum, Note, Getting “Ripped” Off by Copy-Protected CDs, 29 J. 
LEGIS. 125, 223 (2002) (noting that those controlling the Gershwin trusts do not 
have “any more competence to understand and convey the real ‘meaning’ of his 
works than others who might hear his works); Karjala, supra note 217, at 222. 
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expression and creation.252 In the case of the Gershwin family, the family 
has even hindered the access of scholars that might produce alternative 
interpretations.253 
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
CONTEXTS OF COPYRIGHT 
A. Incentives to Create and the Value of Copyright 
The uses of copyright by creators such as Gershwin and his heirs draw 
attention to the implications of copyright structures for cultural 
expression.254 Initial allocations of rights matter.255 The argument that 
copyright, even though an imperfect tool, is acceptable or should be 
expanded because it gives some incentive to creators that will translate 
into a societal benefit is fundamentally flawed, at least in certain instances.  
A holder of a copyright could likely take any right given it and wield 
 
252 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
YALE L.J. 283 (1996). 
253 See Hamm, supra note 73, at 7 (noting role of Gershwin family in impeding 
understanding of Gershwin’s music). 
254 See FEP, Intellectual Freedom, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that the Eldred 
court decision ignored the law’s adverse effects on culture). 
255 Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L REV. 106, 112 
(2002) (“Where the Coase Theorem blunders is in suggesting that no matter the 
initial allocation of the entitlement, people will bargain to the same result. The 
Coase Theorem fails to account for the fact that the initial allocation seems to 
create an endowment effect. When the endowment effect is at work, those who 
initially receive a legal right value it more than they would if the initial 
allocation had given the right to someone else. There is a great deal of evidence 
to this effect.”) (citations omitted). 
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ownership of such a right for its benefit.256 This does not validate the 
initial assignment of the right to the to the holder in the first place or 
structuring the scope of such rights so as to ensure that the holder’s 
grandchildren have a right to receive not only income from the holder’s 
creations, but also to substantially control all uses and interpretations of 
the holder’s works: 
Continued and widespread performances of “Let's Call the Whole 
Thing Gershwin” have a substantial possibility of destroying the 
goodwill associated with Gershwin works by mutilating the 
carefully sculptured works of art so tenaciously preserved by Mr. 
[Ira] Gershwin over the years.  “Let's Call the Whole Thing 
Gershwin” is an agglomeration of Gershwin compositions from a 
large number of different Gershwin musical plays.  In effect Whole 
Thing has taken the arm of one Gershwin sculpture and grafted it 
onto the body of another, while using a head or another arm from 
still other Gershwin sculptures. The resulting damage to the 
Gershwin sculptures is immeasurable and perhaps irreparable. 257 
Musical works are not truly comparable to sculptures in this way, partly 
because musical notes, in particular are not representational, whereas 
sculptures more often are.258 
256 Julio H. Cole, Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs?,
15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 79, 83 (2001) (“Obviously, like any other monopoly 
privilege, patents can be valuable for their owners, though that is not in itself a 
sufficient reason to justify concessions of that sort.”). 
257 Gershwin v. The Whole Thing Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9-10. 
258 Susan McClary, The Blasphemy of Talking Politics during Bach Year, in 
MUSIC AND SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF COMPOSITION, PERFORMANCE AND 
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The view of musical works expressed by the court in Gershwin v. The 
Whole Thing is distorted in that it fails to recognize the musical borrowing 
that was so central to Gershwin’s creative processes and the creative 
processes of many other composers.259 Moreover, the notion of musical 
works being comprised of inseparable elements is clearly not an argument 
that even the Gershwin family follows in practice since they have 
historically been quite happy to decapitate sculptures and license songs or 
parts of songs from works for use in commercials, for example.260 In 
addition, the Gershwin family in fact authorized performances of the 1992 
Tony award winning Broadway musical Crazy For You,261 which was 
comprised of pieces from different Gershwin musicals, which seriously 
undercuts the logic of the court’s argument in Gershwin v. The Whole 
Thing.
In addition, serious consideration needs to be paid to how the structure of 
values surrounding intellectual property rights is actually assembled in 
particular instances.  Current evaluations of intellectual property 
frameworks are based on universal and unitary notions of value.262 As a 
 
RECEPTION 13, 16 (Richard Leppert & Susan McClary eds., 1987) (noting that 
music appears to be non-representational, unlike literature and the visual arts, 
which make use of characters, plots, color and shapes that resemble everyday 
world phenomenon). 
259 See supra notes 93 to 159 and accompanying text; see also Arewa, Hip Hop,
supra note 1. 
260 See supra notes 227 to 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
value of Gershwin song licenses. 
261 
262 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 779, 794 (1994) (“. . . with assumption of a unitary kind of valuation, 
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result, they focus on intellectual property rights as tools of innovation 
generally and assume that innovation and the products resulting from such 
innovation are the major sources of value for holders of such rights in 
specific cases.  One result of this approach is that the entirety of behaviors 
that surround uses of intellectual property rights by holders in other ways 
and for other purposes are often not recognized, let alone adequately 
explained.263 The fact that copyrights are now used as sources to be mined 
for licensing revenue,264 has potentially profound implications for 
copyright frameworks whose goal is to promote the creation of new 
works. Examining the broader context of copyright usage can reveal other 
sources of value that supplement or substitute for those typically assumed 
and that may also elucidate the behaviors of copyright holders. 
One of the major reasons copyright holders may wield copyrights as 
strategic weapons is that they gain value by doing so.  In addition to 
potentially imposing costs that may be unlike those contemplated by 
courts and legal commentators, the benefits copyright holders may accrue 
 
we will sometimes offer inadequate predictions, explanations and 
recommendations for law”). 
263 See Giddens, supra note 50, at 30 (“normative elements of social systems are 
contingent claims which have to be sustained and ‘made to count’ through the 
effective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters.  
Normative sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination, and the 
relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various sorts other than 
expressions of the commitments those norms supposedly engender”). 
264 See Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture 
Got to Do with It?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 230 (2000) (noting that 
in twentieth century, copyright was “looked to as means for securing and 
protecting income streams, and it has been expanded accordingly”). 
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may similarly be different and need to be examined more closely.  This 
value may include benefits such as securing streams of licensing income, 
blocking or preventing commercial competitors or alternative uses or 
interpretations, bolstering the creator’s public image, increased market 
capitalization, increasing stockholder value, gaining greater attractiveness 
to potential acquirers or investors or other factors.265 These benefits may 
thus impose significant costs on other potential users of the underlying 
knowledge on which such copyrights are based.  Since the magnitude and 
importance of borrowing in cultural expression is often underestimated, 
the extent of these costs may not always be fully recognized.  
Consequently, how copyright holders wield their rights also has significant 
implications for the underlying knowledge upon which their copyrights 
are based. 
B. Copyright and Underlying Knowledge: The Implications of the 
Double Intangible 
An intellectual property right may be conceived as involving a double 
intangible or two distinguishable levels of intangible resources.266 The 
first is the intellectual property right itself, such as a copyright.  
Underlying this intellectual property right intangible is the knowledge 
upon which the right is based, which constitutes yet another intangible.  In 
the case of Gershwin compositions, for example, the double intangible 
would be evident at the level of the copyright itself, which would protect 
 
265 See supra notes 61 to 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of SCO. 
266 Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 15 (noting that an intellectual 
property right involves two levels of intangibility, one level relating to the 
intellectual property right itself and an underlying intangible resource embodied 
in the knowledge upon which the intellectual property right is based). 
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the notes and lyrics comprising the piece of music.  These notes and lyrics 
are, however, based on underlying knowledge that might be reflected in a 
number of factors, including common musical traditions upon which the 
copyrighted work is based, musical passages that might have been 
borrowed from prior works, the public domain, or existing musical 
traditions or note sequences such as blue notes that reflect the influence of 
jazz and blues traditions. 267 
An intellectual property right in this sense can be seen as one way to 
represent, characterize and allocate ownership interests with respect to 
particular configurations of such underlying knowledge.  The Eldred court 
recognized this distinction in noting that copyright involves no monopoly 
over knowledge.268 Although this is true in some respects, it does not 
completely account for the behavioral aspects of copyright enforcement, 
particularly with respect to the control of meaning and reinterpretation of 
cultural texts and the existence of strategic behaviors that may magnify the 
chilling effect on the ability of others’ to use knowledge.  These factors 
may effectively give copyright holders a monopoly over underlying 
knowledge. 
The nature of this underlying knowledge determines whether an 
 
267 New Grove, Gershwin, supra note 73, at ___ (“Perhaps the most striking characteristic 
of Gershwin’s melodies is their reliance on blue notes . . . Occasionally the blues idiom 
provides a harmonic structure for Gershwin, as in the second of his three piano preludes on 
the 12-bar blues progression.  That progression also serves as a reference in the Concerto’s 
[Rhapsody in Blue] second movement and in An American in Paris.”). 
268 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (“[C]opyright gives the holder no 
monopoly on any knowledge.  A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any 
fact or idea she acquires from her reading.”). 
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intellectual property right may be attached to the underlying knowledge.  
The fact that a creator’s work is copyrightable reflects a determination that 
the particular configuration of underlying knowledge in the work is 
worthy of intellectual property protection.  Copyright frameworks thus 
embed assumptions about the nature of knowledge that merits copyright 
protection.  Typically, only underlying knowledge that is deemed 
sufficiently original is copyrightable.269 The scope and duration of the 
copyright similarly reflects societal assumptions about value reflected in 
choices about the types and duration of protection to be included within 
copyright frameworks.   
Borrowing is often part of what makes cultural texts recognizable to other 
participants in the cultural context from which such texts emerge.  New 
creations are frequently framed in light of and in relation to past 
experience.270 Copyright as currently constructed involves substantial 
denial of borrowing and collaboration.271 Much of the discourse of CTEA 
 
269 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (“One key aspect of the development of 
copyright in the United States, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards, 
has been an overriding focus on what constitutes sufficient originality to make a 
creation copyrightable.”) (citations omitted). 
270 This framing is evident in terminology and language used to describe new 
innovations.  For example, the motion picture is a picture that moves, a car a 
horseless carriage and the Internet the information superhighway. 
271 William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the 
Ownership of Ideas in the United States at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iphistory.html. (“Today, most 
writing (indeed, most creativity of all sorts) is collaborative.  Equally 
importantly, the extent to which every creator depends upon and incorporates 
into her work the creations of her predecessors is becoming ever more obvious.  
Yet American lawmakers cling stubbornly to the romantic vision.  There are few 
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proponents with respect to the creation of cultural texts reflects a denial or 
deemphasis of borrowing and collaboration.272 This position is in line 
with the revenue stream value maximization approach also taken by many 
CTEA proponents.273 This denial comes out of the seeming need to 
allocate clear and determinate property rights with respect to the 
knowledge that underlies copyrights.  This underlying knowledge is thus 
construed as a separable fragment that can be alienated from broader 
fabric in which it is enmeshed and effectively given to the copyright 
holder for a specified period of time.  This grant of a copyright to the 
holder is characterized as a reward for the holder’s creative activities.  
Copyright, however, typically encompasses knowledge relating to 
elements that may be original contributions of the creator as well as 
preexisting knowledge that is borrowed and then enfolded within the new 
work.   
Once these preexisting and new elements are integrated, though, the 
tendency is to view the holder as having intellectual property rights with 
respect to the entirety of the underlying knowledge, including the 
preexisting knowledge.274 This tendency is reinforced when copyrights 
have longer duration because those viewing or hearing a work are likely 
 
signs that it is losing its grip on the law.  Indeed the recent introduction into 
American copyright law of (a variant of) the Continental theory of moral rights 
suggests that its power may be waxing, not waning.”) (citations omitted). 
272 
273 See Shum, supra note 251, at 146 (noting profit maximization approach of 
entities with vast holdings of copyrights). 
274 See, e.g., Garon, supra note 13, at 549-553 (noting that the ProCD court case 
would permit control of noncopyrightable elements of copyrighted work); see 
also ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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increasingly removed over time from the original context of creation of 
the work.  As a result, discerning borrowed elements of a work is likely to 
become more difficult as copyright duration increases.  Increased duration 
may thus make even assessments of whether and the extent to which other 
works infringe on an existing work more difficult.  Similarly, contrary to 
the assumptions of the Eldred court, strategic behaviors make 
monopolization of underlying knowledge a more likely outcome by virtue 
of a potential chilling effect on borrowing for fear of threats of litigation 
or actual suit.275 
The Romantic author concept, which emphasizes the unique and genius-
like contributions of individual creators and inventors, is a primary 
mechanism by which borrowing and collaboration are denied.276 Modern 
conceptions of authorship as involving inspiration, originality and even 
genius in the creation of autonomous cultural texts are a fairly recent 
historical development.277 Such conceptions are nonetheless used to 
justify allocation of property rights to authors or those deemed worthy of 
 
275 See supra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text. 
276 See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE 15, 21 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing 
the “modern myth that genuine authorship consists in individual acts of 
origination”). 
277 See Janet Wolff, Foreword: The Ideology of Autonomous Art, in MUSIC AND 
SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF COMPOSITION, PERFORMANCE AND RECEPTION 1, 2 
(Richard Leppert & Susan McClary eds., 1987) (“The Romantic notion of the 
autonomy of art, which is still dominant in the late twentieth century, is 
essentially a product of nineteenth-century ideology and social structure.”); 
Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing Romantic author notions with respect 
to popular and classical music). 
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such ownership rights by virtue of their genius, autonomy and 
originality.278 
Without diminishing the significance of acts of creation, the rhetoric of 
authorship and notions of autonomous creation obscure the actual 
processes by which creations and inventions actually come into being.  
Many acknowledge that cultural production involves some sort of 
borrowing or collaboration.279 Fewer, however, fully consider the 
implications of such borrowings and collaborations. 
Consequently, additional consideration should be given to the fact that 
texts often reflect collaboration and borrowing rather than autonomy and 
independent creation and that acts of creation do not and should not 
necessarily involve original or novel elements.  Instead, creators often 
synthesize and borrow, use existing material and model their creations on 
the works of others.280 This is the essence of borrowing that is often 
denied, ignored or minimized in discussions of copyright and creation.  
 
278 See Martha Woodmansee, Genius and the Copyright, in THE AUTHOR, ART,
AND THE MARKET 35, 37 (1994). 
279 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) (noting that knowledge is cumulative and 
that inventors build on what came before); Richard H. Stern, Legal Protection of 
Screen Displays and Other User Interfaces for Computers: A Problem in 
Balancing Incentives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to the 
Utilitarian, 14 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 283, 301 (1989-1990) (noting that 
screen design techniques are cumulative result of incremental contributions by 
mass on anonymous workers and not identifiable as creations of particular 
individuals). 
280 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing borrowing in classical, hop hop and other 
popular music). 
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From a legal perspective the critical question turns on how to allocate 
rights, in the form of copyrights with regard to underlying knowledge, and 
thus establish bounds of acceptable appropriation and mediate between 
existing and original elements that comprise a particular text.  As part of 
this allocation process, tensions between notions of collective rights and 
individual rights must in some manner be addressed or resolved.281 
C. General Concepts of Creation and Specific Production of Cultural 
Texts 
In addition to not adequately considering the implications of specific costs 
and benefits evident in the contexts of copyright use, general views of 
cultural production evident in legal discussions about copyright do not 
adequately envisage the specific and varied ways in which cultural 
production actually occurs.  One way to view originality is as a 
construction intended to represent a particular notion of how underlying 
knowledge is constituted.  As a result, conceptions of original expression 
and determination of what constitutes original expression in large part 
determine what uses are deemed infringements of copyrights based upon 
such knowledge.  The notion of cultural text that pervades copyright 
commentary can be characterized as highly unitary.  Such interpretations 
are rooted in a unitary view of creation that typically denies borrowing and 
collaboration in creation and the reality of varied aesthetics of creative 
production and reconstructs the nature of cultural production to suit this 
 
281 Leighton McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, 22 
MELB. U. L. REV. 310, 316 (1998) (discussing whether collective and individual 
rights can coexist in the same normative discourse). 
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unitary worldview.282 As Gershwin and other examples in the music 
context suggest, this view of cultural production and invention does not 
adequately reflect the complex and varied nature of motivations to create 
new works or complexities of the process by which such new works are 
synthesized and created.283 
One potential consequence is a decrease in the public domain and 
reduction in diversity of cultural texts that exist by virtue of the 
valorization of autonomous creation, which by its nature may permit 
greater amounts of extraction of material from the public domain because 
of its denial of borrowing.  The issue is not just one of keeping certain 
items in the public domain.  Also at issue is the process by which the 
public domain is constituted and the types of texts whose creation or use is 
deemed permissible under existing copyright rules.  Although recognition 
exists in legal scholarship concerning the general fact that cultural texts 
interact with the public domain,284 few conceptualize or fully discuss the 
 
282 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing historical and cultural specificity of 
conceptions of musical composition). 
283 See supra notes 38 to 42 and accompanying text; see also Arewa, Hip Hop,
supra note 1. 
284 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-967 (1990) (noting 
failure of copyright’s paradigm of authorship to account for the raw materials that all 
authors use); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual 
Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 1-2 (2002) (noting the little attention 
given the public domain in intellectual property statutes, cases and scholarly discourse); 
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 33 (2001) (discussing the perceived negative effects of strong 
intellectual property rights on innovation and freedom); R. Polk Wagner, Information 
Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM L. 
REV. 995 (2003) (arguing that intellectual property rights, even in their strong form, are 
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specific processes by which such texts and the public domain are 
constituted, particularly in the specific areas of cultural texts and music. 
D. Controlling Interpretation and Meaning in Cultural Discourses 
The current manner of allocation of copyright ownership rights has 
significant implications for social meaning.  This is not just a reflection of 
the fact that copyright involves elements of expressive culture, but also 
because choices made about copyright rules reflect social norms and have 
significance for symbolic aspects of cultural production and meaning.285 
Descriptions of the outcomes of such choices form an aspect of the 
expressive function of law in that they identify which “consequences 
count and how they should be described.”286 
Consequently, the exclusionary aspects of intellectual property rights 
reflected in control rights also result in exclusion with respect to the 
making and contesting of cultural meanings.287 Such unitary views are 
 
likely to increase the public domain); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public 
Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2004) (noting that firms place information in the public 
domain to preempt or undermine the potential property rights of economic adversaries); 
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 354 (1999) (discussing effects of 
enclosure on the organization of information production). 
285 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
286 Cass R. Sunstein, Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2048 (1996). 
287 See Mahdavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV 495, 592 (2001) 
(discussing situations where “the self-proclaimed guardians of culture are 
excluding other members of the culture from making and contesting cultural 
meanings.”) (citations omitted). 
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reflected, for example, in the Gershwin family’s control over casting in 
Porgy and Bess. Such control has significant implications for public 
policy and social meaning within the broader context of contemporary 
discourse about race and nonconventional casting, for example. 
Systematically ignoring or otherwise denying that certain consequences 
are significant, influences the shape of important means of cultural 
expression.288 The control aspects of intellectual property rights can 
impede the development of cultural texts and production of new cultural 
meanings around existing texts, reinforcing reified and unitary s of 
culture.289 This contrasts with a more nuanced anthropological and 
folkloristic conception of culture and cultural texts with a multiplicity of 
meanings and variants.290 One reason for the unitary conception of 
cultural texts is rooted in a misconception of the cultural context of the 
production of such texts. Such misconceptions construe creation as 
 
288 See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) 
(discussing the implications for trademark law of trademarked symbols being 
increasingly used as vehicles through which social meaning is conveyed). 
289 See Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The 
Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 147 (1996-1997). 
290 See WOLFGANG MIEDER, TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN FOLK LITERATURE 
xi (1987) (“Such traditional texts, certainly oral texts, exist by repletion and 
therefore in numerous variants.”); Sunder, supra note 287 (discussing the role of 
law in unitary view of culture that is associated with the suppression of cultural 
dissent). 
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autonomous in a way that reflects Romantic author conceptions.291 As a 
result, a tendency exists to see the flow of cultural meaning and ownership 
rights in creations as a one-way movement toward the copyright holder, 
who can capture all cultural meaning attached to or associated with the 
intellectual property right and impede any flow of meaning outward.292 
In looking at this process the potential incommensurability of scales used 
must be noted.293 How different participants in this process value cultural 
expression might be quite different both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms, to the extent that the same scale may not in fact be able to be used.  
As a result, the values of producers are not all the same, and commercial 
actors may assign very different values than noncommercial actors.  Heirs 
may assign different values than creators, and the values of diffusers and 
second comers may yet again be dissimilar.  Values expressed by courts 
and in legal scholarship may similarly be quite disparate. 
The recognition and mediation of these multiplicities of potential uses, 
values and interpretations are important.  A unitary and reified view of 
 
291 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of borrowing in the 
creation of music in all genres and periods and the systematic inattention to the pervasive 
nature of borrowing in musical composition in legal discourse about music). 
292 Once extracted from a collaborative or communal context, it is not always 
clear how the uncopyrightable distinct elements comprising knowledge now 
subject to an intellectual property right might be used.  See supra note 274 and 
accompanying text. 
293 See Sunstein, supra note 262; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the 
Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 8 (1975) (“Disputes about 
the meaning of ‘value’ are possible . . . These disputes over the meaning of 
‘value’ may take the form of controversies about what rules of ownership and 
change are best or most acceptable.”). 
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culture makes imposition of a single and unitary view of the function of 
copyright and social meaning derived from the uses of copyright easier.  
Such unitary meanings are increasingly weighted heavily in favor of 
commercial interests.294 The result is a reinforcement of controlling 
discourse of intellectual property rights holders who are already quite 
powerful and who have other means of protecting themselves from 
alternative and even subversive meanings.295 Separating control from 
compensation in copyright doctrine is potentially one way to ameliorate 
this tendency for control of copyright to extend to control of meaning and 
reinterpretation and restore a multiplicity of possible meanings and 
interpretations of cultural texts. 
V. UNFAIR USE AND TRANSMISSION-BASED APPROACHES TO MUSICAL 
COPYRIGHT 
The goals and beneficiaries of copyright frameworks have long been a 
contested issue in American copyright doctrine.296 Reconsideration 
should be given to the construction of copyright frameworks and the 
behaviors that come along with these architectures.  Copyrights should be 
 
294 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); 
Litman, supra note 70, at 22-23 (1996) (discussing role of commercial and 
institutional actors in copyright law). 
295 See ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES (1998) (discussing the implications of hegemonic discourses). 
296 See William Patry, Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the 
Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, ___ (1997) (“Since the inception of 
American copyright law at the end of the eighteenth century, legislators and 
scholars have struggled with two fundamental, related issues. First, what is the 
purpose of copyright? Second, to whom should benefits be granted?”). 
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granted and enforced in a way that is informed by the context of their 
operation and consideration of the underlying rationales of copyright and 
actual uses of copyright. 
A. Control, Compensation and the Appropriation of Returns 
The rationales used to justify copyright protection have been widely 
considered and discussed.297 Current copyright structures typically allow 
holders to have effective control rights with respect to underlying 
knowledge resources by virtue of copyright statutory language that gives 
copyright holders substantial ability to control uses of copyright protected 
works.298 In addition, holders are able to seek judicial and legislative 
enforcement or expansion of their rights.  Through such enforcement, 
holders may play a potentially significant role in determining the scope of 
their rights and influencing which uses by others may be deemed an 
infringement.  This ability to control is thus fundamentally related to 
strategic intellectual property behaviors.299 For copyright holders, control 
 
297 Many of these rationales are not new and have long been used to provide 
support for intellectual property rights protection.  See, e.g., William Fisher, 
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Justin Hughes, 
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988-1989); Netanel, 
supra note 252, at 290 (1996); Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments 
for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 138-167 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Hurt & 
Schuchman, supra note 33; PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1996). 
298 See infra notes 312 to 319 and accompanying text. 
299 See Giddens, supra note 50, at 288 (noting that assessing the strategic actions 
of businesses means “giving primacy to discursive and practical consciousness, 
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rights are often viewed through a compensatory lens.  As a result, such 
rights are seen as the mechanism by which the copyright holder can and in 
fact should ensure that it receives compensation on account of the holder’s 
creation or synthesis of the underlying knowledge.300 This connection 
between control and compensation, however, is neither inevitable nor 
necessary.  It would be possible, for example, to structure an intellectual 
property system that offered a compensation mechanism without entitling 
 
and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries”); see also 
supra notes 61 to 72 and accompanying text. 
300 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 
1610 (1982) (“If the creators of intellectual productions were given no rights to 
control the use made of their works, they might receive few revenues and would 
lack an appropriate level of incentive to create.  Fewer resources would be 
devoted to intellectual productions than their social merit would warrant.”); 
Anthony L. Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, Silicon Epics and 
Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1500-1501 (1987) (advocating 
copyright protection for software programs and noting that the software industry 
could be imperiled without such protection); Michael J. Meurer, Price 
Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital 
Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 848 (1997) (noting that copyright advocates argue 
that “fairness requires that authors and publishers should be able to keep their 
share of the copyright pie in the face of new technologies”); Richard B. Graves, 
Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Failure of the Copyright Clause, 80 NEB.
L. REV. 64, 65 (2001) (”the economic effect of copyright protection is to reserve 
to authors the monetary value of their works by making sales of infringing 
works more difficult and less profitable.  This protection ensures that those who 
produce copyrightable works are far better able to support themselves by doing 
so”) (citations omitted). 
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the holder to control rights in their current form.301 
These elements of control and compensation thus form a primary 
foundation for economic rationales for copyright, which emphasize 
appropriability, or the ability of creators to ensure that they receive a profit 
or return from their creations, as a source of incentives to create.302 The 
 
301 See, e.g., Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 33, at 426 (“. . . without some 
device to assist authors in receiving compensation for their services, some works 
with high costs of creation . . . may not be produced at all.  However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the grant of a copyright monopoly is the only such device 
possible, nor is it the most desirable device”); Cole, supra note 256, at 99-101 
(discussing alternative structures for compensation of creators in absence of a 
copyright regime); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 282 (1970) (noting it would be possible without copyright to arrange for 
compensation of authors); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) 
(discussing replacing copyright with a governmentally administered rewards 
system). 
302 See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (2004) (noting that “incentives provided by 
copyright protection are designed to encourage innovation by creators.”) 
(hereinafter “CED Report”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197-1198 (1996) (noting instrumental rationale 
for copyright as incentive and Locke labor desert theories are both based on 
imagery of expanding copyright protection to relieve the plight of the author); 
Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, Sidney G. Winger, 
Richard Gilbert & Zvi Griliches, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
783, 783 (1987); Lemley, supra note 279, at 993 (noting that intellectual 
property is about incentives to invent and create); Netanel, supra note 252, at 
308-310 (distinguishing between neoclassical approaches and economic 
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appropriation of returns is seen as permitting the creator to generate ex 
post rents by pricing any products or services in which such right is 
embedded like a monopolist and thus recouping high upfront costs it may 
have incurred in developing the knowledge resources underlying 
intellectual property rights, as well as realize a profit.303 The behaviors 
 
incentive rationales for copyright, the first of which focus on copyright as a 
regime of broad, fully exchangeable property rights in creative products with 
allocative efficiency goal, which justifies giving “copyright owners maximum 
rights and leaving allocation of those rights up to the market;” the second of 
which sees copyright as a limited grant, focusing on finding the “right amount of 
copyright protection required to give adequate production incentive.”); Roger E. 
Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Property or 
Monopoly, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 913 (1990) (“The standard 
argument for a patent system is that innovators will not have sufficient incentive 
to produce innovations unless they have a monopoly (exclusive) right to the 
economic returns.”); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton & Kenneth C. Baseman, The 
Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for Software:  The Proper Role 
for Copyright (1994), Paper prepared for June 1994 meeting of the American 
Council on Interoperable Systems in Washington, D.C. (“Governmental 
intervention is clearly desirable to establish property rights in information and to 
prevent users from ‘free riding’ inappropriately on the efforts of its creators); 
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations on the Intellectual Property 
Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 333 (1995) (“The fundamental 
justification for creating property rights in the results of innovation is to deal 
with the appropriability problem.”). 
303 See J. Bradford DeLong, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Sustaining 
U.S. Economic Growth, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 19, 44-45 (H. Aaron, et al. 
eds., 2003), at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/dgk_brook.pdf; Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1070 (1987) (noting that patent 
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permitted creators under existing copyright rules are also acknowledged to 
impose costs as well as inefficiencies in the form of dead weight loss.304 
Copyright then becomes characterized and perceived as a balance between 
benefits in the form of increased production of works and costs in the form 
of restrictions to access, which make it more difficult for future authors to 
create.305 Although the costs and dead weight loss that result from 
copyright are generally acknowledged, views of copyright tend to be 
 
holders may charge higher prices as monopolists than would be possible under 
competitive conditions and noting that these higher prices necessarily entail 
higher costs to users of patented inventions); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the 
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 518 
(1990) (“economic theory supports granting authors copyright in their works.  
However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope because copyright 
imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of induced creative 
activity”, including allowing the owner of the copyright to “charge a monopoly 
price for her works, because it prohibits borrowing from existing works and 
makes it more difficult for future authors to create.”). 
304 In additional to behavioral distortions, this monopoly capacity also imposes 
costs by creating dead weight loss.  See Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect 
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Sterk, supra note 302, at 1209; William 
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1702-1703 (1988). 
305 See Yen, supra note 303, at 518 (noting that the optimal degree of copyright 
maximizes the difference between the benefits of greater creative activity and 
the costs of increased authors’ rights); CED Report, supra note 302, at 8 
(“Copyright law balances protection of initial creators with the importance of 
the competitive supply of follow-on innovation, and is (or should be ) cautious 
about providing control to the initial innovator that would allow barring of 
subsequent innovator or control over the scope and director of their 
innovation.”).   
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based on questionable notions about the nature of free riding.  Conceptions 
of copyright thus discount and even ignore borrowing at least in part as a 
consequence of assumptions that are often made about free riding.  
Discussions of free riding often fail to note sufficiently the fact that 
copyright frameworks result in certain types of free riding being treated 
differently than others,306 as well as the pervasive and inevitable nature of 
free riding in cultural expression.  As is evident in George Gershwin’s 
compositional practice and music composition generally,307 music 
production is virtually impossible without some type of free riding or 
borrowing, either with respect to broader musical traditions and 
conventions or existing works.   
Consequently, the appropriate question as a starting point from a copyright 
perspective should be transformed from one that focuses on how to limit 
borrowing into an inquiry into the acceptable scope of communication, 
free riding or transmission of existing knowledge.  The reality of free 
riding and borrowing in cultural production suggests that a transmission 
based approach to copyright might be fruitful in first of all acknowledging 
 
306 See Dale A. Nance, Foreward: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL.
757, 772 (1990) (questioning the integrity of a system of intellectual property 
that protects certain types of creative effort from free riding more extensively 
than others). 
307 See infra notes ___ to ___ and accompanying text; see also J. Peter Burkholder, 
Borrowing, in 4 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 1-[36] (Stanley 
Sadie ed. 2001) (discussing the pervasiveness of musical borrowing in all musical genres 
and time periods); J. Peter Burkholder, The Uses of Existing Music:  Musical Borrowing as 
a Field, 50 NOTES, 851, 852 (1994) (giving an overview of musical borrowing as a field); 
Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (discussing the significance of musical borrowing for 
copyright frameworks). 
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the essential nature of borrowing in cultural production and secondly 
defining the scope of acceptable transmissions.  This transmission focused 
approach would be a contrast to current perspectives that treat copyright as 
essentially a property right that results from and is merited as a result of an 
autonomous act of creation.308 
A transmission based approach highlights potential complexities of the 
creation of cultural text and the extent to which the use and operation of 
control and compensation rights within copyright do not adequately 
contemplate such complexities.  This is particularly true since the scope of 
a holder’s effective control right is by no means limited to activities 
related to the development of products that incorporate the underlying 
knowledge resource over which the holder exercises control.  This is not 
to imply that the intellectual property right as tool of innovation approach 
is necessarily invalid but to suggest that it offers at best an incomplete 
picture of the operation and uses of intellectual property.  The breadth of 
control given to copyright holders is a direct result of Romantic author 
conceptions and continuing inattention to the importance of borrowing and 
free riding in cultural production.  Further, existing structures do not 
adequately contemplate that a holder may receive value from exercise of 
control rights that has nothing to do with compensation or even creation.  
Consequently, how holders choose to exercise control rights and enforce 
such rights in the construction of intellectual property rights has 
significant implications for behavior as well as the effective operation of 
intellectual property rights structures such as copyright.309 
308 See generally Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
309 See Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 860, 860 (1990) (“. . . the main impact of a product patent is not to create a 
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B. Compensation and Control: Disaggregating Rights Embedded in 
Copyright Structures 
1. The Copyright Balance 
Copyright doctrine is based on an assumed balance between promotion of 
incentives to create new works with public access to copyright protected 
materials.310 The balance in copyright is intended to weigh the benefits of 
the incentives of copyright against the costs of copyright grants evident in 
the exclusion rights given copyright holders that enable them to restrict the 
creation of new works based on copyrighted works as well as the 
reinterpretation of existing copyrighted works.311 The specific context of 
the uses of copyright in particular contexts, however, suggests that general 
costs and benefits may be evident to varying degrees in specific settings 
that may or may not reflect the general assumptions typically imagined. 
2. The Advantages of Disaggregation: A Proposal for 
Separating Control and Compensation of Post-Mortem 
Artistic Legacies in Music 
Any balancing of rights also entails determining what rights should be 
encompassed within copyright frameworks.  Control and compensation 
are typically treated as inevitably united, but are in fact separate rights that 
should at least in certain instances be disaggregated.  As a result, 
instructuring copyright frameworks, attention should be given to how the 
 
monopoly but rather to affect the variety choices that rivals make.  Moreover, 
the particular impact on variety choices is heavily influenced by the particular 
legal mechanisms that are used to enforce patent rights”). 
310 See supra notes 297 to 309 and accompanying text. 
311 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, ___ (2003). 
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compensation and control aspects of copyright contribute to and enhance 
the core goals of copyright. 
Disaggregation could be structured in such a way as to maintain the right 
to receive compensation while minimizing the extent of control over 
future uses of copyrighted works.  One core element of copyright holders’ 
exclusion or control rights is contained in Section 106 of the Copyright 
Act, which describes the exclusive rights of copyright holders with respect 
to their copyrighted protected works.312 Disaggregating compensation and 
control would essentially mean reducing the exclusion rights outlined in 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act with respect to future works, while 
maintaining the right of copyright holders to receive compensation for 
uses of existing material in such future works that might be encompassed 
by the current Section 106 statutory language. 
An initial step toward disaggregation would be a modification of Section 
106(2) and 104(4).  Section 106(2) gives copyright holders the exclusive 
 
312 Section 106 of the Copyright Act contains provisions relating to the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003) (giving copyright 
holders the exclusive right to (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case 
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted 
work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission). 
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right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, while 
Section 106(4) gives copyright holders the exclusive right to perform and 
display musical, dramatic and other works. 
These subsections, and other provisions of the Copyright Act as might be 
necessary to implement this proposed structure, should be modified such 
that music copyright holders would have limited ability after the death of 
the creator to restrict both derivative works and performances or displays 
that seek to reinterpret the copyright protected work.  Following a 
creator’s death, the control rights with respect to these subsections would 
then differ from compensation rights with respect to them.  After a 
creator’s death, uses falling within Sections 106(2) and (4) would be 
permitted (“Permitted Uses”).  In terms of control, certain limitations on 
Permitted Uses would still need to be implemented, such that the scope of 
control would permit a copyright holder to restrict use of copyrighted 
material in certain specific contexts (“Unfair Uses”). Unfair Uses would 
include uses in commercial advertisements, uses for purposes that might 
constitute a misrepresentation and in which clear disclaimers are not used, 
Permitted Uses by a single Permitted User in excess of a reasonable 
amount and uses for strategic or anti-competitive actions that would be 
reasonably likely to damage the market share for the original work. 
Under this proposal, a copyright holder would be able to restrict Unfair 
Uses but could not exercise control over Permitted Uses unless a 
Permitted Use intentionally or maliciously sought to damage the market 
for the original work (an “Exempted Permitted Use”), in which case the 
Permitted Use would be treated in the same manner as an Unfair Use.  The 
copyright holder would be entitled to receive compensation for both 
Permitted Uses and Unfair Uses, but would have limited control rights 
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with respect to Permitted Uses.  Unfair Uses would require a prior license 
from the copyright holder and would thus be substantially similar to the 
existing copyright property rule. 
In contrast, compensation for Permitted Uses should be based on a 
structure in which the person seeking to make a Permitted Use (the 
“Permitted User”) would be required to pay a fee to the copyright holder 
based on the proposed use.  The fees for Permitted Uses (the “Permitted 
Use Fees”) should be essentially a royalty based upon a fixed percentage 
of the net earnings from the new work, which would mean that the 
copyright holder would receive more compensation for uses that are more 
successful financially.  Obviously, determination of the percentage to be 
charged for Permitted Use Fees (the “Permitted Use Rate”) would be a 
crucial aspect of this proposal.  One potential source of guidance for 
Permitted Use Fees could be set threshold rate levels for Permitted Use 
Rates that could be adjusted depending on popularity of Permitted Uses of 
a given work.313 Although copyright holders are likely to be opposed to 
any type of Permitted Uses, allowing Permitted Uses following a creator’s 
death actually has the potential to increase revenues to heirs and legal 
successors.314 For example, such uses can bring attention to works from 
earlier eras or that might otherwise be unknown.315 
313 Professor Fisher’s recently proposed rewards system that would replace 
copyright includes a pricing structure based upon the popularity of later uses of 
a work.  See Fisher, supra note 301, at 199-258 (proposing a rewards system 
that would replace current copyright frameworks). 
314 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STANFORD L. REV.
485, 515-516 (2004) (noting that the R.E.M. 1986 cover of the song Superman 
brought attention to the original 1969 release by an obscure group named Clique 
and resulted in the Clique song being re-issued in a compilation recording in 
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Disaggregation would thus be in line with the goals and objectives of 
copyright law, and reflect the fact that the substantial legally protected 
interest of a creator is the creator’s interest in potential financial returns 
from such creator’s works that come from public’s appreciation of the 
creator’s efforts.316 
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection 
accorded to music has been to give the composer an adequate 
return for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious 
and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with 
the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would 
accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an 
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same 
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might 
 
1998); Joanna Demers, Sampling the 1970s in Hip-Hop, 22 POP. MUSIC 41, 41-
42 (2003) (discussing sampling of 1970s funk and soul recordings and 
soundtracks from Blaxploitation films by hip hop artists); Errol A. Henderson, 
Black Nationalism and Rap Music, 26 J. BLACK STUDIES 308, 311-312 (1996) 
(discussing Public Enemy sampling of 1970s Isaac Hayes tune and noting that 
hip hop “allows for creative synthesis in the context of cross-generational 
cultural transmission”). 
315 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
316 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); Sony Corporation v. 
Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“The immediate effect of our copyright 
law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.”); Alan Latman,
“Probative Similarity” As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1990). 
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be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the 
purpose of protecting his interests.317 
Disaggregation of compensation and control would move copyright in a 
direction that would incorporate to a greater extent the public benefits that 
are an integral part of the copyright balance:318 
Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests 
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information and commerce on the 
other hand.319 
317 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 163-164 (1975) 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909)); see also H.R. Rep. 
No. 2222, 60th  Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski ed., 1976) (hereinafter, 
“1909 House Report”). 
318 See 1909 House Report, supra note 317, at 7 (noting that copyright balances 
between stimulation of production and benefit to the public); Craig W. Dallon, 
The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and 
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 437 (2004) (noting 
that passage of CTEA suggests that Congress did not give serious attention to 
public benefit rationale of copyright); Garon, supra note 13, at  521 (noting that 
Congress has “focused on the economic success of the most dominant providers 
of media content”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-217 (2003) (noting 
that patent involves a more exacting quid pro quo for granting an intellectual 
property right in exchange for the benefit derived by the public than does 
copyright). 
319 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
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Such disaggregation would also mean that the compensation right within 
copyright might not have the same scope, breadth or duration as the 
control right.  Given the goals of copyright, the scope of the control right 
should be substantially less than the compensation right. 
3. The Practical Consequences of Disaggregation 
Disaggregation makes the most sense with respect to copyright law 
treatment of post-mortem artistic legacies.  Consequently, existing 
copyright structures that aggregate compensation and control should at 
most continue to exist during the lives of creators only.  This would 
effectively mean limiting the control aspects of certain provisions of 
existing copyright statutes to at most life.  Provisions that relate to control, 
including Section 106 of the Copyright Act, would thus need to be 
modified under this proposal.   
In the case of Porgy and Bess, disaggregating control from compensation 
would mean that the Gershwin family would be entitled to receive 
compensation from staged productions and derivative works of Gershwin 
creations, but would not be able, for instance, to control casting or 
interpretations that might update or reinterpret the work.  Racial casting 
could thus no longer be stipulated by the Gershwins.  This proposal would 
have an impact on the types of cases the Gershwins could bring and would 
mean a different outcome for cases such as Gershwin Publishing 
Corporation v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,320 where Gershwin 
Publishing sued Columbia Artists Management (CAMI) for contributory 
copyright infringement relating to performers managed by CAMI who 
 
320 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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performed the piece “Bess, You Is My Woman Now” from Porgy and 
Bess at a public for profit event without authorization from Gershwin 
Publishing.  Under the proposal described in this Article, unless the use 
constitutes an Unfair Use, the Gershwins would be limited to seeking 
compensation for such uses to the extent that they were not already 
compensated as a Permitted Use. 
Although the heirs of creators clearly have an interest in Gershwin’s 
works, their interests, at least with respect to control elements, are 
outweighed by the societal benefit that would result from decreasing their 
control rights.  This social benefit would come as a result of the increased 
flow of information, ideas and commerce that were noted as an integral 
part of the copyright balance by the Sony court.321 
C. Switching the Default Rule to Unfair Use: Disaggregation and 
Liability Rules 
Current copyright standards are essentially a property rule that assumes 
that disfavors borrowing except in certain specified instances such as fair 
use and de minimis uses.322 Although this property rule may effectively 
operate as a statutory liability rule in certain respects,323 explicitly 
 
321 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
322 See Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
323 Robert P. Merges, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm: Comments: Of 
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994); 
Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 705 (1996) (noting that property rules are liability rules 
with a high exercise price). 
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acknowledging the advantages of true liability rule structures in music 
copyright would be better suited to actual musical practice: 
The current copyright system is in most respects a property rule 
under which nonconsensual takings are discouraged.  In music 
copyright, such nonconsensual takings are conceived of as 
copyright infringement and are only permissible if the copyright 
owner consents to such use, most often through the granting of 
some type of license. Actual musical practice, however, which has 
always entailed borrowing, is far better suited to a liability rule, 
which would permit infringement of the legal entitlement with ex 
post determination of appropriate compensation.324 
A property rule potentially distorts the creation of music by virtue of the 
fact that borrowing is more difficult under a property rule.325 
Incorporating conceptions of unfair use into copyright doctrine would 
mean moving from a standard of no borrowing except in cases such as fair 
use to a standard that permits borrowing other than in cases of unfair use.  
Unfair use doctrine could be developed through judicial application of 
unfair use standards, incorporation of unfair use concepts in statutes and 
the development of unfair use standard commercial practices.326 
324 Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1 (citations omitted). 
325 A property rule by its nature implicitly assumes that borrowing is not the 
norm and should occur only with permission.  In contrast, a liability rule 
implicitly assumes that borrowing is the norm and makes an ex post 
determination as to compensation. Arewa, Hip Hop, supra note 1. 
326 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright, Borrowing and Unfair Use (2006) (manuscript on 
file with author) (hereinafter, “Arewa, Unfair Use”) 
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A liability rule based on unfair use could be used to refocus the nature of 
copyright as a transmission right rather than ownership right with respect 
to underlying knowledge.327 A transmission based approach would permit 
recognition of the original contributions of the creator as well as the 
collaborative and intertextual elements of the creator’s works.  The 
transmission right could then attach to the specific combination that 
comprises the knowledge intangible underlying copyright as a whole 
without reaching on an individual basis the constituent elements that 
comprise that whole.  A transmission based model is a good fit in the 
music area where borrowing is commonplace across time and musical 
genres.  This would mean practically that transmissions or borrowings 
would in specified cases be presumed to not constitute infringement unless 
they damaged an existing work in specific identifiable ways. 
In the case of Porgy and Bess, no license would be needed to stage a new 
version of Porgy and Bess. The Gershwins could, however, require a 
clear disclaimer that would clearly inform audiences that the production 
was not authorized by the Gershwins and would be able to receive a share 
of revenues from the new production.  In addition, under a liability rule, 
they might still be entitled to damages or be able to obtain an injunction 
against Unfair Uses.  The threshold for such damages should involve a 
standard that requires significant material damage to the prospects of the 
work, which should be distinguishable from the creator’s image or 
persona. 
Focusing on constitutive processes and transmissions rather than states of 
being with regard to property ownership may also shed light with respect 
 
327 Id.
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to the structure of the public domain.  Current notions of the public 
domain can be quite static and reflect a view of the public domain as a 
place or status.328 Viewing the public domain as reflective of a process 
means that what constitutes the public domain is not just a question of 
whether something is or is not in the pool of public domain knowledge but 
also a question about how the public domain is constituted and 
reconstituted, how it interacts with “private” knowledge and how “private” 
spheres of knowledge interact with one other.  Moving in the direction of a 
liability rule based on Unfair Use, combined with the disaggregation of 
control and compensation in certain instances, will help ensure that 
copyright contains rights that are consistent with its goal of compensation 
to authors on account of the creation of new works, not control over all 
uses of such works for a time period that far exceeds the lifetime of those 
alive at the time such works were created. 
Copyright owners may argue that this will reduce the value of copyrights 
to holders and will make transactions more difficult to value.329 Even if 
this were the case, nothing in copyright gives copyright holders the right 
to extract the maximum possible value that might possibly be extracted 
from a copyright.  Rather copyright is a general balance between 
competing interests, including the public interest that is thought to provide 
a mechanism for the creation of new works in specific contexts of 
 
328 See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 463, 467 (2003); Lemley, supra note 279, at 997-998; Chander & 
Sunder, supra note 155, at 1351 (noting romanticization of the public domain). 
329 See Trust Brief, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that petitioner’s assertions in 
Eldred case would throw numerous transactions into doubt potentially rendering 
copyright transactions insecure and uncertain). 
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creation.330 The value of copyrights under the liability rule based structure 
proposed in this paper is largely a question of valuation.  Copyrights could 
be valued under the new system of rules.  The value might be less than 
that under current copyright rules, although this may be hard to predict 
with certainty since uses of existing works in new works can actually spur 
interest in markets for existing works.  Regardless of whether such values 
may be less than those that might occur under a property rule, such values 
are ones that can be determined and calculated. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of combining and synthesizing elements borrowed from various 
sources in the creation of his compositions, George Gershwin created 
music that is heard and appreciated around the world close to 70 years 
after his death.  The music George Gershwin created was greatly 
facilitated by his ability to borrow.  Although some of his borrowings, 
particularly of African American cultural elements, were enabled by a 
copyright structure that mirrored existing societal hierarchies that 
considered the cultural production of African Americans to be part of the 
public domain.  Consequently, such material was seen as readily 
appropriable,331 particularly by white artists who were able to make cover 
 
330 See Litman, supra note 284, at 967 (“The public domain should be 
understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as 
a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material 
of authorship available for authors to use.”). 
331 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 2, at 117-148; Hall, supra note 2, at 31-51; Greene, supra 
note 2, at 354-383. 
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recordings and perform such works for white audiences.332  Such use of 
African American cultural production in a broader societal milieu in which 
African American performers were typically subject to significant 
restrictions on both their ability to perform publicly for non-African 
American audiences.  These restrictions were reinforced by the structure 
and marketing practices of the recording industry, which mean that 
African American recording artists were identified by their race since most 
were placed in the category of “Race” records.333  These dynamics 
reflected the segregation in the broader society that was also a core part of 
how the recording industry categorized and marketed music.334 In fact, 
prior to [1949], the category now termed R&B or Rhythm and Blues was 
 
332 Hall, supra note 2, at 44 (noting Little Richard’s recounting in a Home Box Office 
television special that a version of his rock anthem “Tutti Frutti” that reached the number 
on the pop charts in a version recorded by Pat Boone). 
333 GUTHRIE P. RAMSEY, JR., RACE MUSIC 113 (University of California, 2003) (“In 1920, a 
recording by blues singer Mamie Smith helped to establish the race records institution in 
American popular culture.”); Hall, supra note 2, at 38 (“Under the precepts of the recording 
industry’s segmented marketing systems, however, recordings of their [cornetist Louis 
Armstrong and pianist Ferdinand “Jelly Roll” Morton] music were distributed on ‘race 
record’ labels geared specifically to Blacks and remained invisible to most whites.  By that 
time music recorded by white dance bands, led by Paul Whiteman’s was being introduced 
to mainstream as ‘jazz’ through record labels and performance venues specifically 
marketed to them.”) (citations omitted); David Brackett, What a Difference a Name Makes:  
Two Instances of African-American Popular Music, in THE CULTURAL STUDY OF MUSIC: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 238, 241  (Martin Clayton, Trevor Herbert & Richard Middleton 
eds. 2003) (noting that in the 1920s the recording industry organized the popular music 
fields around the divisions of “popular,” “race,” and “hillbilly”); _____________, in 
RHYTHM AND BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC ___, ___ (Norman 
Kelley, ed. 2005). 
334 Greene, supra note 2, at 353, 362, 374-377, 384-389. 
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actually called Race music that was marketed primarily for an African 
American audience.335 As a result, the race of many African American 
performers could be readily discerned just by virtue of how their music 
was categorized.  Works of white performers who made recordings of this 
same music were not classified as Race music.336 
This racial categorization of music had a profound influence on 
borrowings from African American cultural production and the 
compensation and recognition given for such borrowings.  An Unfair Use 
standard is intended to address instances where borrowings become 
inequitable on account of the nature of the borrowings, the broader 
societal context within which such borrowings occur or other factors.  At 
the same time, this standard gives proper recognition to the importance of 
borrowing in the creation of music.  Under an Unfair Use standard, to the 
extent that Gershwin’s borrowings constituted unfair use, they could be 
enjoined or Gershwin might be required to pay compensation or give 
acknowledgment as to the sources of his material or both. 
Borrowing was an inherent part of Gershwin’s music composition process.  
The control now exerted by copyright holders in the musical arena today 
has the potential to prevent the types of borrowing that helped make 
George Gershwin’s music so memorable and loved: 
 
335 Brackett, supra note 333, at 242 (“The years around 1947 prove instructive:  while the 
music industry was in the process of slowing recognizing the importance of black popular 
music, it effectively excluded the representation of black music from the mainstream.”). 
336 PAUL OLIVER, SONGSTERS AND SAINTS: VOCAL TRADITIONS ON RACE RECORDS ____ 
(Cambridge 1984) (noting that Race records were marketed primarily for a black audience). 
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Marc G. Gershwin, a nephew of George and Ira Gershwin and a co-trustee 
of the Gershwin Family Trust, said: “The monetary part is important, but 
if works of art are in the public domain, you can take them and do 
whatever you want with them. For instance, we've always licensed 'Porgy 
and Bess' for stage performance only with a black cast and chorus. That 
could be debased. Or someone could turn 'Porgy and Bess' into rap 
music.” Indeed, that is just the issue, say critics of copyright extension 
who argue that constant renewals of the copyright law stifle artistic 
innovation, the creation of new works based on the old.337 The view of 
creation expressed by Marc Gershwin would mean that the types of 
creation in which George Gershwin engaged would likely be disallowed 
since his musical practice involved meshing elements from disparate 
traditions.338 
By focusing on ensuring compensation and minimizing control with 
respect to cultural texts, a transmission based liability rule approach to 
copyright frameworks can help ameliorate both the borrowing from 
sources that are for reasons of cultural hierarchies considered to be part of 
the public domain as well as control over copyrighted works that might 
hinder the creation of new works based on such preexisting works.  A 
transmission based approach with a liability rule would require 
compensation with respect to such borrowings, but would seek to 
minimize impediments to and control of borrowings that might serve as 
 
337 Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties?  Even Mickey Mouse 
Joins the Fray, NY TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7. 
338 Garon, supra note 13, at 595 (responding to the Marc Gershwin quotation 
and noting that given that “[t]he work of the Gershwin brothers drew on 
African-American musical traditions.  What could be more appropriate?”). 
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the basis for the creation of future works.  As such, a transmission based 
approach with a liability rule has the potential to both stimulate the 
production of new and vibrant works as well as meet the goals of 
copyright of providing compensation to creators that may incentivize 
creation. 
